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Abstract: It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is
frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary,
principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have
arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution.
Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a
“moving target” both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which
language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the
original motivation for UG – the mesh between learners and languages – arises because language has been shaped to fit the human
brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent “organism,” which
evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by
severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of
linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes,
perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics.
Keywords: biological adaptation; cultural evolution; grammaticalization; language acquisition; language evolution; linguistic change;
natural selection; Universal Grammar
1. Introduction
Natural language constitutes one of the most complex
aspects of human cognition, yet children already have a
good grasp of their native language before they can tie
their shoes or ride a bicycle. The relative ease of acqui-
sition suggests that when a child makes a “guess” about
the structure of language on the basis of apparently
limited evidence, the child has an uncanny tendency to
guess right. This strongly suggests that there must be a
close relationship between the mechanisms by which the
child acquires and processes language and the structure
of language itself.
What is the origin of this presumed close relationship
between the mechanisms children use in acquisition and
the structure of language? One view is that specialized
brain mechanisms specific to language acquisition have
evolved over long periods of natural selection (e.g., Pinker
& Bloom 1990). A second view rejects the idea that these
specialized brain mechanisms have arisen through adap-
tation, and assumes that they have emerged through some
non-adaptationist route, just as it has been argued that
many biological structures are not the product of adaptation
(e.g., Bickerton 1995; Gould 1993; Jenkins 2000; Lightfoot
2000). Both these viewpoints put the explanatory emphasis
on brain mechanisms specialized for language – and ask
how they have evolved.
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In this target article, we develop and argue for a third
view, which takes the opposite starting point: Our question
is not, “Why is the brain so well suited to learning
language?” Instead, we ask “Why is language so well
suited to being learned by the brain?” We propose that
language has adapted through gradual processes of cultural
evolution to be easy to learn to produce and understand.
Thus, the structure of human language must inevitably be
shaped around human learning and processing biases deriv-
ing from the structure of our thought processes, perceptuo-
motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatic con-
straints. Language is easy for us to learn and use, not
because our brains embody knowledge of language, but
because language has adapted to our brains. Following
Darwin (1874), we argue that it is useful metaphorically
to view languages as “organisms” – that is, highly complex
systems of interconnected constraints – that have evolved
in a symbiotic relationship with humans. According to this
view, whatever domain-general learning and processing
biases people happen to have will tend to become
embedded in the structure of language – because it will
be easier to learn to understand and produce languages,
or specific linguistic forms, that fit these biases.
We start by introducing “The Logical Problem of
Language Evolution” (sect. 2), which faces theories
proposing that humans have evolved specialized brain
mechanisms for language. The following two sections,
“Evolution of Universal Grammar by Biological Adap-
tation” (sect. 3) and “Evolution of Universal Grammar
by Non-adaptationist Means” (sect. 4), evaluate adapta-
tionist and non-adaptationist explanations of language
evolution, concluding that both face insurmountable
theoretical obstacles. Instead, we present an alternative
perspective, “Language as Shaped by the Brain”
(sect. 5), in which language is treated as an evolutionary
system in its own right, adapting to the human brain.
The next two sections, “Constraints on Language Struc-
ture” (sect. 6) and “How Constraints Shape Language
over Time” (sect. 7), discuss what biases have shaped
language evolution and how these can be observed in
language change mediated by cultural transmission.
Finally, in section 8, the “Scope of the Argument,” we con-
sider the wider implications of our theory of language
evolution, including a radical recasting of the problem of
language acquisition.
2. The logical problem of language evolution
For a period spanning three decades, Chomsky (1965;
1972; 1980; 1986; 1988; 1993) has argued that a substan-
tial innate endowment of language-specific knowledge
is necessary for language acquisition. These constraints
form a Universal Grammar (UG); that is, a collection of
grammatical principles that hold across all human
languages. In this framework, a child’s language ability
gradually unfolds according to a genetic blueprint in
much the same way as a chicken grows a wing (Chomsky
1988). The staunchest proponents of this view even go as
far as to claim that “doubting that there are language-
specific, innate computational capacities today is a bit
like being still dubious about the very existence of mol-
ecules, in spite of the awesome progress of molecular
biology” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994, p. 335).
There is considerable variation in current conceptions
of the exact nature of UG, ranging from being close to
the Principle and Parameter Theory (PPT; Chomsky
1981) of pre-minimalist generative grammar (e.g., Crain &
Pietroski 2006; Crain et al. 2006), to the Simpler Syntax
(SS) version of generative grammar proposed by Jackend-
off (2002) and colleagues (Culicover & Jackendoff 2005;
Pinker & Jackendoff 2005), to the Minimalist Program
(MP) in which language acquisition is confined to learning
a lexicon from which cross-linguistic variation is proposed
to arise (Boeckx 2006; Chomsky 1995). From the view-
point of PPT, UG consists of a set of genetically specified
universal linguistic principles combined with a set of par-
ameters to account for variations among languages (Crain
et al. 2006). Information from the language environment is
used during acquisition to determine the parameter set-
tings relevant for individual languages. The SS approach
combines elements from construction grammar (e.g.,
Goldberg 2006) with more traditional structural principles
from generative grammar, including principles relating to
phrase structure (X-bar theory), agreement, and case-
marking. Along with constraints arising from the syntax-
semantic interface, these basic structural principles form
part of a universal “toolkit” of language-specific mechan-
isms, encoded in a genetically specified UG (Culicover
& Jackendoff 2005). By contrast, proponents of MP con-
strue language as a perfect system for mapping between
sound and meaning (Chomsky 1995). In departure from
earlier generative approaches, only recursion (in the
form of Merge) is considered to be unique to the human
language ability (Hauser et al. 2002). Variation among
languages is now explained in terms of lexical parameteri-
zation (Borer 1984); that is, differences between languages
are no longer explained in terms of parameters associated
with grammars (as in PPT), but primarily in terms of
parameters associated with particular lexical items
(though some non-lexical parameters currently remain;
Baker 2001; Boeckx 2006).
Common to these three current approaches to genera-
tive grammar is the central assumption that the constraints
of UG (whatever their form) are fundamentally arbitrary –
that is, not determined by functional considerations. That
is, these principles cannot be explained in terms of learn-
ing, cognitive constraints, or communicative effectiveness.
For example, consider the principles of binding, which
have come to play a key role in generative linguistics
(Chomsky 1981). The principles of binding capture pat-
terns of, among other things, reflexive pronouns (e.g.,
himself, themselves) and accusative pronouns (him,
them, etc.), which appear, at first sight, to defy functional
explanation. Consider Examples (1) to (4), where the
subscripts indicate co-reference, and asterisks indicate
ungrammaticality.
1. Johni sees himselfi.
2. Johni sees himi.
3. Johni said hei/j won.
4. Hei said Johni won.
In (1) the pronoun himself must refer to John; in (2) it
cannot. In (3) the pronoun he may refer to John or to
another person; in (4) it cannot refer to John. These and
many other cases indicate that an extremely rich set of pat-
terns govern the behavior of pronouns, and these patterns
appear arbitrary – it appears that numerous alternative
patterns would, from a functional standpoint, serve
Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
490 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5
equally well. These patterns are instantiated in PPT by the
principles of binding theory (Chomsky 1981), in SS by
constraints arising from structural and/or syntax-seman-
tics interface principles (Culicover & Jackendoff 2005),
and in MP by limitations on movement (internal merge;
Hornstein 2001). Independent of their specific formu-
lations, the constraints on binding, while apparently uni-
versal across natural languages, are assumed to be
arbitrary and, hence, may be presumed to be part of the
genetically encoded UG.
Putative arbitrary universals, such as the restrictions on
binding, contrast with functional constraints on language.
Whereas the former are hypothesized to derive from the
internal workings of a UG-based language system, the
latter originate from cognitive and pragmatic constraints
related to language acquisition and use. Consider the ten-
dency in English to place long phrases after short ones; for
example, as evidenced by so-called “heavy-NP shifts.” In
Example (5) shown below, the long (or “heavy”) direct-
object noun phrase (NP), the book he had not been able
to locate for over two months, appears at the end of the
sentence, separated from its canonical postverbal position
by the prepositional phrase (PP) under his bed. Both
corpus analyses (Hawkins 1994) and psycholinguistic
sentence-production experiments (Stallings et al. 1998)
suggest that Example (5) is much more acceptable than
the standard (or “non-shifted”) version in Example (6),
in which the direct-object NP is placed immediately fol-
lowing the verb.
5. John found PP[under his bed] NP[the book he had not
been able to locate for over two months].
6. John found NP[the book he had not been able to
locate for over two months] PP[under his bed].
Whereas individuals speaking head-initial languages,
such as English, tend to prefer short phrases before long
ones, speakers of head-final languages, such as Japanese,
have been shown to have the opposite long-before-short
preference (Yamashita & Chang 2001). In both cases, the
preferential ordering of long versus short phrases can be
explained in terms of minimization of memory load and
maximization of processing efficiency (Hawkins 2004). As
such, the patterns of length-induced phrasal reordering
are generally considered within generative grammar to be
a performance issue related to functional constraints
outside the purview of UG (although some functionally
oriented linguists have suggested that these kinds of
performance constraints may shape grammar itself; e.g.,
Hawkins 1994; 2004). In contrast, the constraints inherent
in UG are arbitrary and non-functional in the sense that
they do not relate to communicative or pragmatic consider-
ations, nor do they derive from limitations on the mechan-
isms involved in using or acquiring language. Indeed, some
generative linguists have argued that aspects of UG hinder
communication (e.g., Chomsky 2005b; Lightfoot 2000).
If we suppose that such arbitrary principles of UG are
genetically specified, then this raises the question of the
evolutionary origin of this genetic endowment. Two views
have been proposed. Adaptationists emphasize a gradual
evolution of the human language faculty through natural
selection (e.g., Briscoe 2003; Corballis 1992; 2003; Dunbar
2003; Greenfield 1991; Hurford 1991; Jackendoff 2002;
Nowak et al. 2001; Pinker 1994; 2003; Pinker & Bloom
1990; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005). Linguistic ability confers
added reproductive fitness, leading to a selective pressure
for language genes1; richer language genes encode increas-
ingly elaborate grammars. In contrast, non-adaptationists
(e.g., Bickerton 1995 – but see Bickerton 2003; Chomsky
1988; Jenkins 2000; Lightfoot 2000; Piattelli-Palmarini
1989) suggest that natural selection played only a minor
role in the emergence of language in humans, focusing
instead on a variety of alternative possible evolutionary
mechanisms by which UG could have emerged de novo
(e.g., as a result of as few as two or three key mutation
“events”; Lanyon 2006).
In the next two sections, 3 and 4, we argue that both of
these views, as currently formulated, face profound theor-
etical difficulties resulting in a logical problem of language
evolution.2 This is because, on analysis, it is mysterious
how proto-language – which must have been, at least
initially, a cultural product likely to be highly variable
over both time and geographical locations – could have
become genetically fixed as a highly elaborate biological
structure. Hence, there is no currently viable account of
how a genetically encoded UG could have evolved. In sub-
sequent sections (5 to 7), we argue that the brain does not
encode principles of UG – and therefore neither adapta-
tionist nor non-adaptationist solutions are required.
Instead, language has been shaped by the brain: Language
reflects pre-existing, and hence non-language-specific,
human learning and processing mechanisms.
3. Evolution of Universal Grammar by
biological adaptation
The adaptationist position is probably the most widely
held view of the origin of UG. We first describe adapta-
tionism in biology and its proposed application to UG
before outlining three conceptual difficulties for adapta-
tionist explanations of language evolution.
3.1. Adaptation: The very idea
Adaptation is a candidate explanation for the origin of any
innate biological structure. In general, the idea is that
natural selection has favored genes that code for biological
structures that increase fitness (in terms of expected
numbers of viable offspring).3 Typically, a biological struc-
ture contributes to fitness by fulfilling some purpose – the
heart is assumed to pump blood, the legs to provide loco-
motion, or UG to support language acquisition. If so,
natural selection will generally favor biological structures
that fulfill their purpose well, so that, over the generations,
hearts will become well adapted to pumping blood, legs
well adapted to locomotion, and any presumed biological
endowment for language acquisition will become well
adapted to acquiring language.
Perhaps the most influential statement of the adapta-
tionist viewpoint is by Pinker and Bloom (1990). They
argue that “natural selection is the only scientific expla-
nation of adaptive complexity. ‘Adaptive complexity’
describes any system composed of many interacting
parts where the details of the parts’ structure and arrange-
ment suggest design to fulfill some function” (p. 709; their
emphasis). As another example of adaptive complexity,
they refer to the exquisite optical and computational
sophistication of the vertebrate visual system. Pinker and
Bloom note that such a complex and intricate mechanism
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has an extremely low probability of occurring by chance.
Whatever the influence of non-adaptational factors (see
sect. 4 of our article), they argue that there must addition-
ally have been substantial adaptation to fine-tune a system
as complex as the visual system. Given that language
appears as complex as vision, Pinker and Bloom conclude
that it is also highly improbable that language is entirely
the product of non-adaptationist processes (see also
Pinker 2003).
The scope and validity of the adaptationist viewpoint in
biology is controversial (e.g., Dawkins 1986; Gould 2002;
Gould & Lewontin 1979; Hecht Orzak & Sober 2001);
and some theorists have used this controversy to question
adaptationist views of the origin of UG (e.g., Bickerton
1995; Lewontin 1998). Here, we take a different tack.
We argue that, whatever the merits of adaptationist expla-
nation in general, and as applied to vision in particular, the
adaptationist account cannot extend to a putative UG.
3.2. Why Universal Grammar could not be an
adaptation to language
Let us suppose that a genetic encoding of universal prop-
erties of language did, as the adaptationist view holds, arise
as an adaptation to the environment, here to the linguistic
environment. This point of view seems to work most natu-
rally for aspects of language that have a transparent func-
tional value. For example, the compositional character of
language (i.e., the ability to express in an infinite number
of messages using a finite number of lexical items) seems
to have great functional advantages. A biological endow-
ment that allows, or perhaps requires, that language has
this form appears likely to lead to enhanced communi-
cation; and hence, to be positively selected. Thus, over
time, functional aspects of language might be expected
to become genetically encoded across the entire popu-
lation. But UG, according to Chomsky (e.g., 1980; 1988),
consists precisely of linguistic principles that appear
highly abstract and arbitrary – that is, they have no func-
tional significance. To what extent can an adaptationist
account of the evolution of a biological basis for language
explain how a genetic basis could arise for such abstract
and arbitrary properties of language?
Pinker and Bloom (1990) provide an elegant approach to
this question. They suggest that the constraints imposed by
UG, such as the binding constraints (mentioned in sect. 2
above), can be construed as communication protocols for
transmitting information over a serial channel. Although
the general features of such protocols (e.g., concerning
compositionality, or the use of a small set of discrete
symbols) may be functionally important, many of the
specific aspects of the protocol do not matter, as long as
everyone (within a given speech community) adopts the
same protocol. For example, when using a modem to com-
municate between computers, a particular protocol might
have features such as odd parity, handshake on, 7 bit, and
so forth. However, there are many other settings that
would be just as effective. What is important is that the
computers that are to interact adopt the same set of
settings – otherwise communication will not be possible.
Adopting the same settings is therefore of fundamental
functional importance to communication between compu-
ters, but the particular choice of settings is not. Similarly,
when it comes to the specific features of UG, Pinker and
Bloom suggest that “in the evolution of the language
faculty, many ‘arbitrary’ constraints may have been selected
simply because they defined parts of a standardized com-
municative code in the brains of some critical mass of
speakers” (1990, p. 718).4 Thus, such arbitrary constraints
on language can come to have crucial adaptive value to
the language user; genes that favor such constraints will
be positively selected. Over many generations, the arbitrary
constraints may then become innately specified.
We will argue that this viewpoint faces three fundamen-
tal difficulties, concerning the dispersion of human popu-
lations, language change, and the question of what is
genetically encoded. We consider these in turn.
3.2.1. Problem 1: The dispersion of human popula-
tions. Pinker and Bloom’s (1990) analogy with communi-
cations protocols, while apt, is, however, something of a
double-edged sword. Communications protocols and
other technical standards typically diverge rapidly unless
there is concerted oversight and enforcement to maintain
common standards. Maintaining and developing common
standards is an integral part of software and hardware
development. In the absence of such pressures for stan-
dardization, protocols would rapidly diverge. Given that
language presumably evolved without top-down pressures
for standardization, divergence between languages seems
inevitable. To assume that “universal” arbitrary features
of language would emerge from adaptation by separate
groups of language users, would be analogous to assuming
that the same set of specific features for computer com-
munication protocols might emerge from separate teams
of scientists, working in separate laboratories (e.g., that
different modem designers independently alight on odd
parity, handshake on, 7-bit error correction, and so on).
Note that this point would apply equally well, even if the
teams of scientists emerged from a single group. Once
cut off from each other, groups would develop in indepen-
dent ways.
Indeed, in biological adaptation, genes appear to rapidly
evolve to deal with a specific local environment. Thus,
Darwin observed rich patterns of variations in fauna
(e.g., finches) across the Galapagos Islands, and inter-
preted these variations as adaptation to local island con-
ditions. Hence, if language genes have adapted to local
linguistic environments, we should expect a range of
different biologically encoded UGs, each specifically
adapted to its local linguistic context. Indeed, one might
expect, if anything, that language-genes would diverge
especially rapidly – because the linguistic environment
in each population is assumed to be itself shaped by the
different language-genes in each subpopulation, thus
amplifying the differences in the linguistic environment.
If so, then people should have, at minimum, some specific
predisposition to learn and process languages associated
with their genetic lineage. This does not appear to be
the case, and it is a key assumption of the generative lin-
guistics perspective that the human language endowment
does not vary in this way but is universal across the species
(Chomsky 1980; Pinker 1994).
There is an interesting contrast here with the human
immune system, which has evolved to a very rapidly chan-
ging microbial environment. Crucially, the immune
system can build new antibody proteins (and the genetic
mechanisms from which antibody proteins are constructed)
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without having to eliminate old antibody proteins (Goldsby
et al. 2003). Therefore, natural selection will operate to
enrich the coverage of the immune system (though such
progress will not always be cumulative, of course); there is
no penalty for the immune system following a fast-moving
“target” (defined by the microbial environment). But the
case of acquiring genes coding for regularities in language
is very different – because, at any one time, there is just
one language (or at most two or three) that must be acquir-
ed – and, hence, a bias that helps learn a language with
property P will thereby inhibit learning languages with
not-P. The fact that language change is so fast (so that
whether the current linguistic environment has property
P or not will vary rapidly, in the time-scale of biological
evolution) means that such biases will, on balance, be
counterproductive.
Given that the immune system does co-evolve with the
microbial environment, different co-evolutionary paths
have been followedwhenhumanpopulations have diverged.
Therefore, populations that have co-evolved to their local
microbial environment are often poorly adapted to other
microbial environments. For example, when Europeans
began to explore the New World, they succumbed in large
numbers to the diseases they encountered, while conversely,
European diseases caused catastrophic collapse in indigen-
ous populations (e.g., Diamond 1997). If an innate UG had
co-evolved with the linguistic environment, similar radically
divergent co-evolutionary paths might be expected. Yet, as
we have noted, the contrary appears to be the case.
The problem of divergent populations arises across a
range of different scenarios concerning the relationship
between language evolution and the dispersion of human
populations. One scenario is that language evolution is
recent and occurred during the dispersion of modern
humans (Homo sapiens sapiens). In this case, whether
language was discovered once, and then spread through-
out human populations, or was discovered in various
locations independently, there remains the problem that
adaptations to language would not be coordinated across
geographically dispersed groups. It is tempting to
suggest that all of these sublanguages will, nonetheless,
obey universal grammatical principles, thus providing
some constancy in the linguistic environment. But this
appeal would, of course, be circular, as we are attempting
to explain the origin of such principles. We shall repeat-
edly have to steer around this circularity trap below.
An alternative scenario is that language evolution pre-
dates the dispersion of modern humans. If so, then it is
conceivable that prior dispersions of hominid populations,
perhaps within Africa, did lead to the emergence of
diverse languages and diverse UGs, adapted to learning
and processing such languages, and therefore that, sub-
sequently, one local population proved to be adaptively
most successful and came to displace other hominid popu-
lations. Thus, on this account, our current UG might con-
ceivably be the only survivor of a larger family of such UGs
as a result of a population “bottleneck” – the universality of
UG would arise, then, because it was genetically encoded in
the sub-population fromwhichmodernhumansdescended.5
This viewpoint is not without difficulties. Some
interpretations of the genetic and archaeological evidence
suggest that the last bottleneck in human evolution
occurred at between 500,000 and 2,000,000 years ago
(e.g., Hawks et al. 2000); few researchers in language
evolution believe that language, in anything like its
modern form, is this old. Moreover, even if we assume a
more recent bottleneck, any such bottleneck must at
least predate the 100,000 years or so since the geographi-
cal dispersion of human populations, and 100,000 years
still seems to provide sufficient time for substantial linguis-
tic divergence to occur. Given that the processes of genetic
adaptation to language most likely would continue to
operate,6 different genetic bases for language would be
expected to evolve across geographically separated popu-
lations. That is, the evolution of UG by adaptation would
appear to require rapid adaptations for language prior to
the dispersion of human populations, followed by an
abrupt cessation of such adaptation, for a long period
after dispersion. The contrast between the evolution of
the putative “language organ” and that of biological pro-
cesses, such as digestion, is striking. The digestive system
is evolutionarily very old, and many orders of magnitude
older than the recent divergence of human populations.
Nonetheless, digestion appears to have adapted in import-
ant ways to recent changes in the dietary environment; for
example, with apparent co-evolution of lactose tolerance
and the domestication of milk-producing animals (Beja-
Pereira et al. 2003).
3.2.2. Problem 2: Language change.Whatever the timing
of the origin of language and hominid dispersion, the thesis
that a genetically encoded UG arose through adaptation
faces a second problem: that, even within a single popu-
lation, linguistic conventions change rapidly. Hence, the
linguistic environment over which selectional pressures
operate presents a “moving target” for natural selection. If
linguistic conventions change more rapidly than genes
change via natural selection, then genes that encode
biases for particular conventions will be eliminated –
because, as the language changes, thebiaseswill be incorrect,
and, hence, decrease fitness. More generally, in a fast-
changing environment, phenotypic flexibility to deal with
various environments will typically be favored over genes
that bias the phenotype narrowly toward a particular envi-
ronment. Again, there is a tempting counterargument – that
the linguistic principles of UG will not change, and hence
these aspects of language will provide a stable linguistic
environment over which adaptation can operate. But, of
course, this argument falls into the circularity trap, because
the genetic endowment of UG is proposed to explain
language universals; so it cannot be assumed that the
language universals pre-date the emergence of the genetic
basis for UG.
Christiansen et al. (2006) illustrate the problems raised
by language change in a series of computer simulations.
They assume the simplest possible set-up: that (binary) lin-
guistic principles and language “genes” stand in a one-to-
one correspondence. Each gene has three alleles – two,
each of which is biased in favor of a version of the corre-
sponding principle, and one neutral allele.7 Agents learn
the language by trial-and-error, where their guesses are
biased according to which alleles they have. The fittest
agents are allowed to reproduce, and a new generation
of agents is produced by sexual recombination and
mutation. When the language is fixed, there is a selection
pressure in favor of the “correctly” biased genes, and these
rapidly come to dominate the population, as illustrated
by Figure 1. This is an instance of the Baldwin effect
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(Baldwin 1896; for discussion, see Weber & Depew 2003)
in which information that is initially learned becomes
encoded in the genome.
A frequently cited example of the Baldwin effect is the
development of calluses on the keels and sterna of ostriches
(Waddington 1942). The proposal is that calluses are initially
developed in response to abrasion where the keel and sterna
touch the ground during sitting. Natural selection then
favored individuals that could develop calluses more
rapidly, until callus development became triggered within
the embryo and could occur without environmental stimu-
lation. Pinker and Bloom (1990) suggest that the Baldwin
effect in a similar way could be the driving force behind
the adaptation of UG. Natural selection will favor learners
who are genetically disposed rapidly to acquire the language
to which they are exposed. Hence, over many generations
this process will lead to a genetically specified UG.
However, when language is allowed to change (e.g.,
because of exogenous forces such as language contact), the
effect reverses – biased genes are severely selected against
when they are inconsistent with the linguistic environment,
and neutral genes come to dominate the population. The
selection in favor of neutral genes occurs even for low
levels of language change (i.e., the effect occurs, to some
degree, even if language change equals the rate of genetic
mutation). But, of course, linguistic change (prior to any
genetic encoding) is likely to have been much faster than
genetic change. After all, in the modern era, language
change has been astonishingly rapid, leading, for example,
to the wide phonological and syntactic diversity of the
Indo-European language group, from a common ancestor
about 10,000 years ago (Gray & Atkinson 2003). Language
in hunter-gatherer societies changes at least as rapidly.
Papua, New Guinea, settled within the last 50,000 years,
has an estimated one-quarter of the world’s languages.
These are enormously linguistically diverse, and most orig-
inate in hunter-gatherer communities (Diamond 1992).8
Thus, from the point of view of natural selection, it
appears that language, like other cultural adaptations,
changes far too rapidly to provide a stable target over
which natural selection can operate. Human language
learning, therefore, may be analogous to typical biological
responses to high levels of environmental change – that is,
to develop general-purpose strategies which apply across
rapidly changing environments, rather than specializing
to any particular environment. This strategy appears to
have been used, in biology, by “generalists” such as cock-
roaches and rats, in contrast, for example, to pandas and
koalas, which are adapted to extremely narrow environ-
mental niches.
A potential limitation of our argument so far is that we
have assumed that changes in the linguistic environment
are “exogenous.” But many aspects of language change
may be “endogenous,” that is, may arise because the
language is adapting as a result of selection pressures
from learners, and, hence, their genes. Thus, one might
imagine the following argument: Suppose there is a
slight, random, genetic preference for languages with
feature A rather than B. Then this may influence the
language spoken by the population to have feature A,
and this may in turn select for genes that favor the
feature A.9 Such feedback might, in principle, serve to
amplify small random differences into, ultimately, rigid
arbitrary language universals. However, as Figure 2 illus-
trates, when linguistic change is genetically influenced,
rather than random, it turns out that, while this amplifica-
tion effect can occur, and lead to a Baldwin effect, it does
not emerge from small random fluctuations. Instead, it
only occurs when language is initially strongly influenced
by genes. But if arbitrary features of language would
have to be predetermined strongly by the genes from
the very beginning, then this leaves little scope for sub-
sequent operation of the Baldwin effect as envisioned by
Pinker and Bloom (1990).
3.2.3. Problem 3: What is genetically encoded? Even if
the first two difficulties for adaptationist accounts of UG
could be solved, the view still faces a further puzzle:
Figure 1. The effect of linguistic change on the genetic encoding
of arbitrary linguistic principles. Results are shown from a
simulation with a population size of 100 agents, a genome size of
20, survival of the top 50% of the population, and starting with
50% neutral alleles. When there is no linguistic change, alleles
encoding specific aspects of language emerge quickly – that is, a
Baldwin effect occurs – but when language is allowed to change,
neutral alleles become more advantageous. Similar results were
obtained across a wide range of different simulation parameters.
(Adapted from Christiansen, Reali & Chater 2006)
Figure 2. TheBaldwin effect, where genes influence language: the
role of population influence (i.e., genetic “feedback”) on the
emergence of the Baldwin effect for language-relevant alleles
when language is allowed to change 10 times faster than biological
change. Only when the pressure from the learners’ genetic biases
is very high ( 50%) can the Baldwin effect overcome linguistic
change. (Adapted from Christiansen, Reali & Chater 2006)
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Why is it that genetic adaptation occurred only to very
abstract properties of language, rather than also occurring
to its superficial properties? Given the spectacular variety
of surface forms of the world’s languages, in both syntax
(including every combination of basic orderings of subject,
verb and object, and a wide variety of less constrained
word orders) and phonology (including tone and click
languages, for example), why did language genes not adapt
to these surface features?10 Why should genes become
adapted to capture the extremely rich andabstract set of pos-
sibilities countenanced by the principles of UG, rather than
merely encoding the actual linguistic possibilities in the
specific language that was being spoken (i.e., the phonologi-
cal inventory and particular morphosyntactic regularities of
the early click-language, fromwhich the Khoisan family ori-
ginated and which might be the first human language; e.g.,
Pennisi 2004)? The unrelenting abstractness of the universal
principles makes them difficult to reconcile with an adapta-
tionist account.
One of the general features of biological adaptation is
that it is driven by the constraints of the immediate
environment. It can have no regard for distant or future
environments that might one day be encountered. For
example, the visual system is highly adapted to the laws
of optics as they hold in normal environments. Thus, the
length of a stick in water is misestimated by human
vision, because it does not correct for the refraction of
light through water (this being not commonly encountered
in the human visual world). By contrast, the visual system
of the archerfish, which must strike airborne flies with a
water jet from below the water surface, does make this cor-
rection (Rossel et al. 2002). Biological adaptation produces
systems designed to fit the environment to which adap-
tation occurs; there is, of course, no selectional pressure
to fit environments that have not occurred or those that
might occur at some point in the future. Hence, if a UG
did adapt to a past linguistic environment, it would seem
inevitable that it would adapt to that language environ-
ment as a whole: thus adapting to its specific word order,
phonotactic rules, inventory of phonemic distinctions,
and so on. In particular, it seems very implausible that
an emerging UG would be selected primarily for extre-
mely abstract features, which apply equally to all possible
human languages, not just the language evident in the
linguistic environment in which selection operates. This
would be analogous to an animal living in a desert environ-
ment somehow developing adaptations that are not
specific to desert conditions, but that are equally adaptive
in all terrestrial environments.
The remarkable abilities of the young indigo bunting to use
stars for navigational purposes – even in the absence of older
birds to lead theway – might at first seem to counter this line
of reasoning (e.g., Hauser 2001; Marcus 2004). Every
autumn this migratory bird uses the location of Polaris in
the night sky to fly from its summer quarters in theNortheast
United States to its winter residence in the Bahamas. As
demonstrated by Emlen (1970), the indigo bunting uses
celestial rotation as a reference axis to discover which stars
point to true north. Thus, when Emlen raised young fledg-
lings in a planetarium that was modified to rotate the night
sky around Betelgeuse, the birds oriented themselves as if
north was in the direction of this bright star. Crucially,
what has become genetically encoded is not a star map –
because star constellations change over evolutionary time
and thus form moving targets – but instead that which is
stable: that stationary stars indicate the axis of earth’s rotation,
and hence true north.
Similarly, it is tempting to claim that the principles of
UG are just those that are invariant across languages,
whereas contingent aspects of word order or phonology
will vary across languages. Thus, one might suggest that
only the highly abstract, language-universal, principles of
UG will provide a stable basis upon which natural selec-
tion can operate. But this argument is again, of course, a
further instance of the circularity trap. We are trying to
explain how a putative UG might become genetically
fixed, and hence we cannot assume UG is already in
place. Thus, this counterargument is blocked.
We are not, of course, arguing that abstract structures
cannot arise by adaptation. Indeed, abstract patterns, such
as the body plan of mammals or birds, are conserved
across species and constitute a complex and highly inte-
grated system. Notice, though, that such abstract structures
are still tailored to the specific environment of each species.
Thus, while bats, whales, and cows have a common abstract
body plan, these species embody dramatically different
instantiations of this pattern, adapted to their ecological
niches in the air, in water, or on land. Substantial modifi-
cations of this kind can occur quite rapidly, as a result of
changes in a small numbers of genes and/or their pattern
of expression. For example, the differing beak shape in
Darwin’s finches, adapted to different habitats in the Gala-
pagos Islands, may be largely determined by as few as two
genes: BMP4, the expression of which is associated with the
width, as well as depth, of beaks (Abzhanov et al. 2004), and
CaM, the expression of which is correlated with beak length
(Abzhanov et al. 2006). Again, these adaptations are all
related closely to the local environment in which an organ-
ism exists. In contrast, adaptations for UG are hypothesized
to be for abstract principles holding across all linguistic
environments, with no adaptation to the local environment
of specific languages and language users.
In summary, Pinker and Bloom (1990), as we have seen,
drawaparallel between theadaptationist accountof thedevel-
opment of the visual system and an adaptationist account of a
putative language faculty. But the above arguments indicate
that the two cases are profoundly different. The principles
of optics and the structure of the visual world have many
invariant features across environments (e.g., Simoncelli &
Olshausen 2001), but the linguistic environment is vastly
different from one population to another. Moreover, the
linguistic environment, unlike the visual environment, will
itself be altered in line with any genetic changes in the pro-
pensity to learn and use languages, thus further amplifying
differences between linguistic environments. We conclude,
then, that linguistically driven biological adaptation cannot
underlie the evolution of language.
It remains possible, though, that the development of
language did have a substantial impact on biological evol-
ution. The arguments given here merely preclude the
possibility that linguistic conventions that would originally
differ across different linguistic environments could
somehow become universal across all linguistic commu-
nities, by virtue of biological adaptation to the linguistic
environment. This is because, in the relevant respects,
the linguistic environment for the different populations
is highly variable, and hence any biological adaptations
could only serve to entrench such differences further.
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But theremight be features that are universal across linguis-
tic environments that might lead to biological adaptation,
such as the means of producing speech (Lieberman
1984), or the need for enhanced memory capacity, or
complex pragmatic inferences (Givo´n & Malle 2002).
However, these language features are likely to be functio-
nal – that is, they facilitate language use – and therefore
would typically not be considered part of UG.
It is consistent with our arguments that the emergence
of language influenced biological evolution in a more
indirect way. The possession of language might have fun-
damentally changed the patterns of collective problem
solving and other social behavior in early humans, with a
consequent shift in the selectional pressures on humans
engaged in these new patterns of behavior. But universal,
arbitrary constraints on the structure of language cannot
emerge from biological adaptation to a varied pattern of
linguistic environments. Thus, the adaptationist account
of the biological origins of UG cannot succeed.
4. Evolution of Universal Grammar by
non-adaptationist means
Some theorists advocating a genetically based UG might
concur with our arguments against adaptationist accounts
of language evolution. For instance, Chomsky (1972; 1988;
1993) has for more than two decades expressed strong
doubts about neo-Darwinian explanations of language
evolution, hinting that UG may be a by-product of
increased brain size or yet unknown physical or biological
evolutionary constraints. Further arguments for a radically
non-adaptationist perspective have been advanced by
Jenkins (2000), Lanyon (2006), Lightfoot (2000), and
Piattelli-Palmarini (1989; 1994).
Non-adaptationists typically argue that UG is both
highly complex and radically different from other biologi-
cal machinery (though see Hauser et al. 2002). They
suggest, moreover, that UG appears to be so unique in
terms of structure and properties, that it is unlikely to be
a product of natural selection amongst random mutations.
However, we argue that non-adaptationist attempts to
explain a putative language-specific genetic endowment
also fail.
To what extent can any non-adaptationist mechanism
account for the development of a genetically encoded
UG, as traditionally conceived? In particular, can such
mechanisms account for the appearance of genetically
specified properties that are presumed to be (a) idiosyn-
cratic to language, and (b) of substantial complexity?
We argue that the probability that non-adaptationist
factors played a substantial role in the evolution of UG is
vanishingly small.
The argument involves a straightforward application of
information theory. Suppose that the constraints embodied
in UG are indeed language-specific and hence do not
emerge as side-effects of existing processing mechanisms.
This means that UG would have to be generated
at random by non-adaptationist processes. Suppose
further that the information required to specify a language
acquisition device, so that language can be acquired and
produced, over and above the pre-linguistic biological
endowment can be represented as a binary string of
N bits (this particular coding assumption is purely for
convenience). Then the probability of generating this
sequence ofN bits by chance is 22N. If the language-specific
information could be specified using a binary string that
would fit on one page of normal text (which would presum-
ably be a considerable underestimate, from the perspective
of most linguistic theory), then N would be over 2,500.
Hence, the probability of generating the grammar by a
random process would be less than 222,500. So, to generate
this machinery by chance (i.e., without the influence of
the forces of adaptation) would be expected to require of
the order of 22,500 individuals. But the total population of
humans over the last two million or so years, including the
present, is measured in billions and is much smaller than
235.Hence, the probability of non-adaptationistmechanisms
“chancing” upon a specification of a language organ or
language instinct through purely non-adaptationist means
is astronomically unlikely.11
It is sometimes suggested, apparently in the face of this type
of argument, that the recent evolutionary–developmental
biology literature has revealed how local genetic changes,
for example, on homeobox genes, can influence the expression
of other genes, and through a cascade of developmental influ-
ences, result in extensive phenotypic consequences (e.g.,
Gerhart & Kirschner 1997; Laubichler & Maienschein
2007). Yet, suppose that UG arises from a small “tweak” to
pre-linguistic cognitive machinery; then general cognitive
machinery will provide the vast bulk of the explanation of
language structure. Without this machinery, the impact of
the tweak would be impossible to understand. Thus, the
vision of Universal Grammar as a language-specific innate
faculty or language organ would have to be retracted. But
the idea that a simple tweak might lead to a complex, highly
interdependent, and intricately organized system, such as
the putative UG, is highly implausible. Small genetic
changes lead to modifications of existing complex systems,
and these modifications can be quite far-reaching; however,
they do not lead to the construction of new complexity. A
mutation might lead to an insect having an extra pair of legs,
and a complex set of genetic modifications (almost certainly
over strong and continuous selectional pressure) may
modify a leg into a flipper, but no single gene creates an
entirely new means of locomotion, from scratch. The whole
burden of the classic arguments for UG is that UG is both
highly organized and complex, and utterly distinct from
general cognitive principles. Thus, the emergence of a puta-
tive UG requires the construction of a new complex system,
and the argument sketched above notes that the probability
of even modest new complexity arising by chance is astro-
nomically low.
The implication of this argument is that it is extremely
unlikely that substantial quantities of linguistically idiosyn-
cratic information have been specified by non-adaptationist
means. Indeed, the point applies more generally to the gen-
eration of any complex, functional biological structures.
Thus, it is not clear how any non-adaptationist account
can explain the emergence of something as intricately
complex as UG.
Some authors who express skepticism concerning the
role of adaptation implicitly recognize this kind of theoreti-
cal difficulty. Instead, many apparently complex and arbi-
trary aspects of cognition and language are suggested to
have emerged out of the constraints on building any
complex information processing system, given perhaps
currently unknown physical and biological constraints
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(e.g., Chomsky 1993; see Kauffman [1995] for a related
viewpoint on evolutionary processes). A related perspec-
tive is proposed by Gould (1993), who views language
as a spandrel – that is, as emerging as a by-product of
other cognitive processes. Another option would be to
appeal to exaptation (Gould & Vrba 1982), whereby a bio-
logical structure that was originally adapted to serve one
function is put to use to serve a novel function. Yet the
non-adaptationist attracted by these or other non-adapta-
tionist mechanisms is faced with a dilemma. If language
can emerge from general physical, biological, or cognitive
factors, then the complexity and idiosyncrasy of UG is illu-
sory; language emerges from general non-linguistic
factors, a conclusion entirely consistent with the view we
advocate here. If, by contrast, UG is maintained to be
sui generis and not readily derivable from general pro-
cesses, the complexity argument bites: the probability of
a new and highly complex adaptive system emerging by
chance is astronomically low.
The dilemma is equally stark for the non-adaptationist
who attempts to reach for other non-adaptationist mech-
anisms of evolutionary change. There are numerous mech-
anisms that amount to random perturbations (from the
point of view of the construction of a highly complex adap-
tive system) (Schlosser & Wagner 2004). These include
genetic drift (Suzuki et al. 1989), the random fluctuations
in gene frequencies in a population; genetic hitch-hiking
(Maynard-Smith 1978), a mechanism by which non-
selected genes “catch a ride” with another gene (nearby
on the chromosome) that was subject to selection; epigen-
esis (Jablonka & Lamb 1989), which causes heritable cell
changes as a result of environmental influences but
without corresponding changes to the basic DNA
sequences of that cell; horizontal genetic transfer
(Syvanen 1985) by which genetic material shifts from
one species to another; and transposons (McClintock
1950), mobile genetic elements that can move around in
different positions within the genome of a cell and thus
alter its phenotype. Each of these mechanisms provides
a richer picture of the mechanisms of evolutionary
change, but none provides an answer to the question of
how novel and highly complex adaptive systems, such as
the putative UG, might emerge de novo. However, if
language is viewed as embodying novel complexity, then
the emergence of this complexity by non-adaptationist
(and hence, from an adaptive point of view, random)
mechanisms is astronomically unlikely.
We may seem to be faced with a paradox. It seems clear
that the mechanisms involved in acquiring and processing
language are enormously intricate and moreover inti-
mately connected to the structure of natural languages.
The complexity of these mechanisms rules out, as we
have seen in this section, a non-adaptationist account of
their origin. However, if these mechanisms arose
through adaptation, this adaptation cannot, as we argued
in section 3, have been adaptation to language. But if the
mechanisms that currently underpin language acquisition
and processing were originally adapted to carry out other
functions, then how is their apparently intimate relation-
ship with the structure of natural language to be
explained? How, for example, are we to explain that the
language acquisition mechanisms seem particularly well
adapted to learning natural languages, but not to any of
a vast range of conceivable non-natural languages (e.g.,
Chomsky 1980)? As we now argue, the paradox can be
resolved if we assume that the “fit” between the mechan-
isms of language acquisition and processing, on the one
hand, and natural language, on the other, has arisen
because natural languages themselves have “evolved” to
be as easy to learn and process as possible: Language
has been shaped by the brain, rather than vice versa.
5. Language as shaped by the brain
We propose, then, to invert the perspective on language
evolution, shifting the focus from the evolution of language
users to the evolution of languages. Figure 3 provides a
conceptual illustration of these two perspectives (see also
Andersen 1973; Hurford 1990; Kirby & Hurford 1997).
The UG adaptationists (a) suggest that selective pressure
toward better language abilities gradually led to the selec-
tion of more sophisticated UGs. In contrast, (b) we
propose to view language as an evolutionary system in its
own right (see also e.g., Christiansen 1994; Deacon 1997;
Keller 1994; Kirby 1999; Ritt 2004), subject to adaptive
pressures from the human brain. As a result, linguistic
adaptation allows for the evolution of increasingly expres-
sive languages that can nonetheless still be learned and
processed by domain-general mechanisms. From this per-
spective, we argue that the mystery of the fit between
human language acquisition and processing mechanisms
and natural language may be unraveled; and we might,
furthermore, understand how language has attained its
apparently “idiosyncratic” structure.
Figure 3. Illustration of two different views on the direction of
causation in language evolution: (a) biological adaptations of the
brain to language (double arrows), resulting in gradually more
intricate UGs (curved arrows) to provide the basis for increasingly
complex language production and comprehension (single arrows);
(b) cultural adaptation of language to the brain (double arrows),
resulting in increasingly expressive languages (curved arrows) that
are well suited to being acquired and processed by domain-
general mechanisms (single arrows).
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Instead of puzzling that humans can only learn a small
subset of the infinity of mathematically possible languages,
we take a different starting point: the observation that
natural languages exist only because humans can
produce, learn, and process them. In order for languages
to be passed on from generation to generation, they
must adapt to the properties of the human learning and
processing mechanisms; the structures in each language
form a highly interdependent system, rather than a collec-
tion of independent traits. The key to understanding the fit
between language and the brain is to understand how
language has been shaped by the brain, not the reverse.
The process by which language has been shaped by the
brain is, in important ways, akin to Darwinian selection.
Hence, we suggest that it is a productive metaphor to
view languages as analogous to biological species,
adapted through natural selection to fit a particular eco-
logical niche: the human brain.
This viewpoint does not rule out the possibility that
language may have played a role in the biological evolution
of hominids. Good language skills may indeed enhance
reproductive success. But the pressures working on
language to adapt to humans are significantly stronger
than the selection pressures on humans to use language.
In case of the former, a language can only survive if it is
learnable and processable by humans. On the other
hand, adaptation towards language use is merely one of
many selective pressures working on hominid evolution
(including, for example, avoiding predators and finding
food). Whereas humans can survive without language,
the opposite is not the case. Thus, prima facie language
is more likely to have been shaped to fit the human
brain rather than the other way round. Languages that
are hard for humans to learn and process cannot come
into existence at all.
5.1. Historical parallels between linguistic and
biological change
The idea of language as an adaptive, evolutionary system has
a prominent historical pedigree dating back to Darwin and
beyond. One of the earliest proponents of the idea that
languages evolve diachronically was the eighteenth-century
language scholar, Sir William Jones, the first Western
scholar to study Sanskrit and note its affinity with Greek
and Latin (Cannon 1991). Later, nineteenth-century lin-
guistics was dominated by an organistic view of language
(McMahon 1994). Franz Bopp, one of the founders of
comparative linguistics, regarded language as an organism
that could be dissected and classified (Davies 1987).
Wilhelm von Humboldt, the father of generative grammar
(Chomsky 1965; Pinker 1994), argued that “language, in
direct conjunction with mental power, is a fully-fashioned
organism” (von Humboldt 1836/1999, p. 90; original empha-
sis). More generally, languages were viewed as having life-
cycles that included birth, progressive growth, procreation,
and eventually decay and death. However, the notion of evol-
ution underlying this organistic view of language was largely
pre-Darwinian. This is perhaps reflected most clearly in the
writings of another influential linguist, August Schleicher.
Although he explicitly emphasized the relationship between
linguistics and Darwinian theory (Schleicher 1863, quoted
in Percival 1987), Darwin’s principles of mutation, variation,
and natural selection did not enter into the theorizing about
language evolution (Nerlich 1989). Instead, the evolution of
language was seen in pre-Darwinian terms as the progres-
sive growth towards attainment of perfection, followed by
decay.
Darwin (1874), too, recognized the similarities between
linguistic and biological change12:
The formation of different languages and of distinct species,
and the proofs that both have been developed through a
gradual process, are curiously parallel . . . We find in distinct
languages striking homologies due to community of descent,
and analogies due to a similar process of formation. The
manner in which certain letters or sounds change when
others change is very like correlated growth . . . Languages,
like organic beings, can be classed in groups under groups;
and they can be classed either naturally, according to
descent, or artificially by other characters. Dominant
languages and dialects spread widely, and lead to the gradual
extinction of other tongues. A language, like a species, when
once extinct, never . . . reappears . . . A struggle for life is con-
stantly going on among the words and grammatical forms in
each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are
constantly gaining the upper hand . . . The survival and preser-
vation of certain favored words in the struggle for existence is
natural selection. (p. 106)
In this sense, natural language can be construed meta-
phorically as akin to an organism whose evolution has
been constrained by the properties of human learning
and processing mechanisms. A similar perspective on
language evolution was revived, within a modern evol-
utionary framework, by Stevick (1963) and later by
Nerlich (1989). Sereno (1991) has listed a number of par-
allels between biological organisms and language (with the
biological comparisons in parentheses):
An intercommunicating group of people defines a language
(cf. gene flow in relation to a species); language abilities
develop in each speaker (cf. embryonic development); language
must be transmitted to offspring (cf. heritability); there is a low
level process of sound and meaning change that continuously
generates variation (cf. mutation); languages gradually diverge,
especially when spatially separated (cf. allopatric speciation);
geographical distributions of dialects (cf. subspecies, clines)
gradually give rise to wholesale rearrangements of phonology
and syntax (cf. macroevolution); sociolinguistic isolation can
lead to language divergence without spatial discontinuity
(cf. sympatric speciation). (Sereno 1991, p. 472)
Christiansen (1994) pushed the analogy a little further,
suggesting that language may be viewed as a “beneficial
parasite” engaged in a symbiotic relationship with its
human hosts, without whom it cannot survive (see also
Deacon 1997). Symbiotic parasites and their hosts tend
to become increasingly co-adapted (e.g., Dawkins 1976).
But note that this co-adaptation will be very lopsided,
because the rate of linguistic change is far greater than
the rate of biological change. Whereas Danish and Hindi
needed less than 7,000 years to evolve from a common
hypothesized proto-Indo-European ancestor into very
different languages (Gray & Atkinson 2003), it took our
remote ancestors approximately 100,000–200,000 years
to evolve from the archaic form of Homo sapiens into
the anatomically modern form, sometimes termed Homo
sapiens sapiens. Indeed, as we argued in section 3, the
rapidity of language change – and the geographical dis-
persal of humanity – suggests that biological adaptation
to language is negligible. This suggestion is further corro-
borated by work in evolutionary game theory, showing that
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when two species with markedly different rates of adap-
tation enter a symbiotic relationship, the rapidly evolving
species adapts to the slowly evolving one, but not the
reverse (Frean & Abraham 2004).
5.2. Language as a system
But in what sense should language be viewed as akin to an
integrated organism, rather than as a collection of separate
traits, evolving relatively independently? The reason is that
language is highly systematic – so much so, indeed, that
much of linguistic theory is concerned with tracking the
systematic relationships among different aspects of linguis-
tic structure. Although language is an integrated system, it
can, nonetheless, be viewed as comprising a complex set of
“features” or “traits” which may or may not be passed on
from one generation to the next (concerning lexical
items, idioms, aspects of phonology, syntax, and so on).
To a first approximation, traits that are easy for learners
to acquire and use will become more prevalent; traits
that are more difficult to acquire and use will disappear.
Thus, selectional pressure from language learners and
users will shape the way in which language evolves. Cru-
cially, the systematic character of linguistic traits means
that, to some degree at least, the fates of different traits
in a language are intertwined. That is, the degree to
which any particular trait is easy to learn or process will,
to some extent, depend on the other features of the
language – because language users will tend to learn and
process each aspect of the language in light of their experi-
ence with the rest. This picture is familiar in biology – the
selectional impact of any gene depends crucially on the
rest of the genome; the selectional forces on each gene,
for good or ill, are tied to the development and functioning
of the entire organism.
Construing language as an evolutionary system has impli-
cations for explanations ofwhat is being selected in language
evolution. From the viewpoint of generative grammar, the
unit of selection would seem to be either specific UG prin-
ciples (in PPT; Newmeyer 1991), particular parts of the UG
toolkit (in SS; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005), or recursion in
the form of Merge (in MP; Hauser et al. 2002). In all cases,
selection would seem to take place at a high level of abstrac-
tion that cuts across a multitude of specific linguistic
constructions. Our approach suggests a different perspec-
tive inspired by the “lexical turn” in linguistics (e.g., Combi-
natory Categorical Grammar, Steedman 2000; Head-driven
Phrase Structure Grammar, Sag & Pollard 1987; Lexical-
Functionalist Grammar, Bresnan 1982), focusing on specific
lexical items with their associated syntactic and semantic
information. Specifically, we adopt a Construction Grammar
view of language (e.g., Croft 2000; 2001; Goldberg 2006;
O’Grady 2005), proposing that individual constructions con-
sisting of words or combinations thereof are among the basic
units of selection.
To spell out the parallel, the idiolect of an individual
speaker is analogous to an individual organism; a language
(e.g., Mandarin, French) is akin to a species. A linguistic
“genotype” corresponds to the neural representation
of an idiolect, instantiated by a collection of mental
“constructions,” which are here analogous to genes, and
gives rise to linguistic behavior – the language “phenoty-
pe” – characterized by a collection of utterances and
interpretations. Just as the fitness of an individual gene
depends on its interaction with other genes, so the
fitness of an individual construction is intertwined with
those of other constructions; that is, constructions are
part of a (linguistic) system. A species in biology is
defined by the ability to interbreed; a “language species”
is defined by mutual intelligibility. Hence, interbreeding
and mutually intelligible linguistic interactions can be
viewed as analogous processes by which genetic material
and constructions can propagate.
The long-term survival of any given construction is
affected both by its individual properties (e.g., frequency
of usage) and how well it fits into the overall linguistic
system (e.g., syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic overlap
with other constructions). In a series of linguistic and
corpus-based analyses, Bybee (2007) has shown how fre-
quency of occurrence plays an important role in shaping
language from phonology to morphology to morphosyntax,
due to the effects of repeated processing experiences with
specific examples (either types or tokens). Additionally,
groups of constructions overlapping in terms of syntactic,
semantic, and/or pragmatic properties emerge and form
the basis for usage-based generalizations (e.g., Goldberg
2006; Tomasello 2003). Crucially, however, these group-
ings lead to a distributed system of local generalizations
across partially overlapping constructions, rather than
the abstract, mostly global generalizations of current gen-
erative grammar.
In psycholinguistics, the effects of frequency and pattern
overlap have been observed in so-called Frequency 
Regularity interactions. As an example, consider the acqui-
sition of the English past tense. Frequently occurring map-
pings, such as go ! went, are learned more easily than
more infrequent mappings, such as lie ! lay. However,
low-frequency patterns may be more easily learned if they
overlap in part with other patterns. Thus, the partial overlap
in the mappings from stem to past tense in sleep ! slept,
weep ! wept, keep ! kept (i.e., -eep ! -ept) make
the learning of the these mappings relatively easy even
though none of the words individually have a particularly
high frequency. Importantly, the two factors – frequency
and regularity (i.e., degree of partial overlap) – interact
with each other. High-frequency patterns are easily learned
independent of whether they are regular or not, whereas
the learning of low-frequency patterns suffers if they are
not regular (i.e., if they do not have partial overlap with
other patterns). Results from psycholinguistic experimen-
tation and computational modeling have observed such
Frequency  Regularity interactions across many aspects of
language, including auditory word recognition (Lively et al.
1994), visual word recognition (Seidenberg 1985), English
past tense acquisition (Hare & Elman 1995), and sentence
processing (Juliano & Tanenhaus 1994; MacDonald &
Christiansen 2002; Pearlmutter & MacDonald 1995).
In our case, we suggest that similar interactions between
frequency and pattern overlap are likely to play an import-
ant role in language evolution. Individual constructions may
survive through frequent usage or because they participate
in usage-based generalizations through syntactic, semantic,
or pragmatic overlap with other similar constructions.
Additional support for this suggestion comes from artificial
language learning studies with human subjects, demonstrat-
ing that certain combinations of artificial-language struc-
tures are more easily learned than others given sequential
learning biases (e.g., Christiansen 2000; Reeder 2004;
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Saffran 2001; and see sect. 6.3 of this target article). For
example, Ellefson and Christiansen (2000) compared human
learning across two artificial languages that only differed
in the order of words in two out of six sentence types.
They found that not only was the more “natural” language
learned better overall, but also that the four sentence types
common to both languages were learned better as well.
This suggests that the artificial languages were learned as
integrated systems, rather than as collections of indepen-
dent items.
Further corroboration comes from a study by Kaschak
and Glenberg (2004) who had adult participants learn
the needs construction (e.g., “The meal needs cooked”),
a feature of the American English dialect spoken in the
northern midlands region from western Pennsylvania
across Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to Iowa. The training
on the needs construction facilitated the processing of
related modifier constructions (e.g., “The meal needs
cooked vegetables”), again suggesting that constructions
form an integrated system that can be affected by the
learning of new constructions. Thus, although construc-
tions are selected independently, they also provide an
environment for each other within which selection
takes place, just as the selection of individual genes are
tied to the survival of the other genes that make up an
organism.
5.3. The nature of language universals
We have argued that language is best viewed as a linguis-
tic system adapted to the human brain. But if evolution is
unlikely to have bestowed us with an innate UG, then
how can we account for the various aspects of language
that UG constraints are supposed to explain? That is,
how can we explain the existence of apparent language
universals, in the form of regularities in language struc-
ture and use? Notice, however, that is it by no means
clear exactly what counts as a language universal.
Rather, the notion of language universals differs con-
siderably across language researchers (e.g., the variety
in perspectives among contributions in Christiansen
et al., in press). Many linguists working within the gen-
erative grammar framework see universals as primarily,
and sometimes exclusively, deriving from UG (e.g.,
Hornstein & Boeckx, in press; Pinker & Jackendoff, in
press). Functional linguists, on the other hand, view uni-
versals as arising from patterns of language usage due to
pragmatic, processing, and other constraints, and ampli-
fied in diachronic language change (e.g., Bybee, in
press). However, even within the same theoretical lin-
guistic framework, there is often little agreement about
what the exact universals are. For example, when survey-
ing specific universals proposed by different proponents
of UG, Tomasello (2004) found little overlap among
proposed universals.
Although there may be little agreement about specific
universals, some consensus can nonetheless be found
with respect to their general nature. Thus, within main-
stream generative grammar approaches, including MP
and PPT, language universals are seen as arising from
the inner workings of UG. Hornstein and Boeckx
(in press) refer to such UG-based universals as internalist
or I-Universals. They note that:
on this conception I-Universals are likely to be (and have been
found to be) quite abstract. They need not be observable.
Thus, even were one to survey thousands of languages
looking for commonalities, they could easily escape detection.
In this they contrast with Greenbergian Universals, which we
would call E(xternalist)-Universals. In fact, on this conception,
the mere fact that every language displayed some property P
does not imply that P is a universal in the I-sense. Put more
paradoxically, the fact that P holds universally does not imply
that P is a universal. Conversely, some property can be an
I-Universal even if only manifested in a single natural
language. The only thing that makes something an I-Universal
on this view is that it is a property of our innate ability to grow a
language (p. 4).
Thus, from the perspective of MP and PPT, language
universals are by definition properties of UG; that is,
they are formal universals (Chomsky 1965). A similar
view of universals also figures within the SS framework
(Culicover & Jackendoff 2005), defined in terms of the
universal toolkit encoded in UG. Because different
languages are hypothesized to use different subsets of
tools, the SS approach – like MP and PPT – suggests
that some universals may not show up in all languages
(Pinker & Jackendoff, in press). However, both notions
of universals face the logical problem of language evol-
ution discussed above (in sects. 2–4): How could the
full set of UG constraints have evolved if any single lin-
guistic environment only ever supported a subset of
them?
The solution to this problem, we suggest, is to adopt
a non-formal conception of universals in which they
emerge from processes of repeated language acquisition
and use. We see universals as products of the interaction
among constraints deriving from the way our thought pro-
cesses work, from perceptuo-motor factors, from cognitive
limitations on learning and processing, and from prag-
matic sources (see sect. 6 below). This view implies that
most universals are unlikely to be found across all
languages; rather, “universals” are more akin to statistical
trends tied to patterns of language use. Consequently,
specific universals fall on a continuum ranging from
being attested to only in some languages to being found
across most languages. An example of the former is the
class of implicational universals, such as that verb-final
languages tend to have postpositions (Dryer 1992),
whereas the presence of nouns and verbs in most, if not
all, languages (minimally as typological prototypes; Croft
2001) is an example of the latter. Thus, language univer-
sals, we suggest, are best construed as statistical ten-
dencies with varying degrees of universality across the
world’s languages.
We have argued that language is too variable, both in
time and space, to provide a selectional pressure that
might shape the gradual adaptation of an innate UG
encoding arbitrary, but universal linguistic constraints.
Moreover, a putative innate UG would be too complex
and specialized to have credibly arisen through non-adapta-
tionist mechanisms. Instead, we have proposed that the fit
between language and the brain arises because language
has evolved to be readily learned and processed by the
brain. We now consider what kinds of non-linguistic con-
straints are likely to have shaped language to the brain,
and given rise to statistical tendencies in language structure
and use.
Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
500 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5
6. Constraints on language structure
We have proposed that language has adapted to the non-
linguistic constraints deriving from language learners and
users, giving rise to observable linguistic universals. But
how far can these constraints be identified? To what
extent can linguistic structure previously ascribed to an
innate UG be identified as having a non-linguistic basis?
Clearly, establishing a complete answer to this question
would require a vast program of research. In this section,
we illustrate how research from different areas of the
language sciences can be brought together to explain
aspects of language previously thought to require the exist-
ence of UG for their explanation. For the purpose of expo-
sition, we divide the constraints into four groups relating
to thought, perceptuo-motor factors, cognition, and prag-
matics. These constraints derive from the limitations and
idiosyncratic properties of the human brain and other
parts of our body involved in language (e.g., the vocal
tract). However, as we note further on in section 6.5, any
given linguistic phenomenon is likely to arise from a combi-
nation of multiple constraints that cut across these group-
ings, and, thus, across different kinds of brain mechanisms.
6.1. Constraints from thought
The relationship between language and thought is poten-
tially abundantly rich, but also extremely controversial.
Thus, the analytic tradition in philosophy can be viewed
as attempting to understand thought through a careful
analysis of language (e.g., Blackburn 1984). It has been
widely assumed that the structure of sentences (or utter-
ances, and perhaps the contexts in which they stand),
and the inferential relations over them, provide an analysis
of thought. A standard assumption is that thought is largely
prior to, and independent of, linguistic communication.
Accordingly, fundamental properties of language, such as
compositionality, function-argument structure, quantifi-
cation, aspect, and modality, may arise from the structure
of the thoughts language is required to express (e.g.,
Schoenemann 1999).
Presumably, language also provides a reasonably effi-
cient mapping of the mental representation of thoughts,
with these properties, into phonology. This viewpoint
can be instantiated in a variety of ways. For example,
Steedman’s emphasis on incremental interpretation (e.g.,
that successive partial semantic representations are con-
structed as the sentence unfolds – i.e., the thought that a
sentence expresses is built up piecemeal) is one motivation
for categorical grammar (e.g., Steedman 2000). From a
very different stance, the aim of finding a “perfect”
relationship between thought and phonology is closely
related to the goals of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky
1995).13 Indeed, Chomsky has recently suggested (e.g.,
Chomsky 2005b) that language may have originated as a
vehicle for thought and only later became exapted to
serve as a system of communication. This viewpoint
would not, of course, explain the content of a putative
UG, which concerns principles for mapping mental rep-
resentations of thought into phonology; and this mapping
surely is specific to communication: inferences are, after
all, presumably defined over mental representations of
thoughts, rather than phonological representations, or,
for that matter, syntactic trees.
The lexicon is presumably also strongly constrained by
processes of perception and categorization – the mean-
ings of words must be both learnable and cognitively
useful (e.g., Murphy 2002). Indeed, the philosophical
literature on lexical meaning, from a range of theoretical
perspectives, sees cognitive constraints as fundamental to
understanding word meaning, whether these constraints
are given by innate systems of internal representation
(Fodor 1975) or primitive mechanisms of generalization
(Quine 1960). Cognitive linguists (e.g., Croft & Cruise
2004) have argued for a far more intimate relation
between thought and language:. For example, basic con-
ceptual machinery (e.g., concerning spatial structure)
and the mapping of such structure into more abstract
domains (e.g., via metaphor) are, according to some
accounts, evident in languages (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson
1980). And from a related perspective (e.g., Croft 2001),
some linguists have argued that semantic categories of
thought (e.g., of objects and relations) may be shared
between languages, whereas syntactic categories and con-
structions are defined by language-internal properties,
such as distributional relations, so that the attempt to
find cross-linguistic syntactic universals is doomed to
failure.
6.2. Perceptuo-motor constraints
The motor and perceptual machinery underpinning lan-
guage seems inevitably to have some influence on language
structure. The seriality of vocal output, most obviously,
forces a sequential construction of messages. A perceptual
and memory system that is typically a “greedy” processor,
and has a very limited capacity for storing “raw” sensory
input of any kind (e.g., Haber 1983), may, moreover,
force a code which can be interpreted incrementally
(rather than the many practical codes in communication
engineering, in which information is stored in large
blocks, e.g., Mackay 2003). The noisiness and variability
(both with context and speaker) of vocal – or, indeed, sign-
ed – signals may, moreover, force a “digital” communi-
cation system, with a small number of basic messages:
that is, one that uses discrete units (phonetic features or
phonemes).
The basic phonetic inventory is transparently related to
deployment of the vocal apparatus, and it is also possible
that it is tuned, to some degree, to respect “natural” per-
ceptual boundaries (Kuhl 1987). Some theorists have
argued for more far-reaching connections. For example,
MacNeilage (1998) argues that aspects of syllable struc-
ture emerge as a variation on the jaw movements involved
in eating; and for some cognitive linguists, the perceptual-
motor system is a crucial part of the machinery on which
the linguistic system is built (e.g., Hampe 2006). The
depth of the influence of perceptual and motor control
on more abstract aspects of language is controversial, but
it seems plausible that such influence may be substantial.
6.3. Cognitive constraints on learning and processing
In our framework, language acquisition is construed not as
learning a distant grammar, but as learning how to process
language. Although constraints on learning and processing
are often treated separately (e.g., Bybee 2007; Hawkins
2004; Tomasello 2003), we see them as being highly
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intertwined, subserved by the very same underlying mech-
anisms. Language processing involves extracting regu-
larities from highly complex sequential input, pointing
to a connection between general sequential learning
(e.g., planning, motor control, etc.; Lashley 1951) and
language: both involve the extraction and further proces-
sing of discrete elements occurring in complex temporal
sequences. It is therefore not surprising that sequential
learning tasks have become an important experimental
paradigm for studying language acquisition and processing
(sometimes under the heading of “artificial grammar/
language learning” [Go´mez & Gerken 2000] or “statistical
learning” [Saffran 2003]). Sequential learning has thus
been demonstrated for a variety of different aspects of
language, including: speech segmentation (Curtin et al.
2005; Saffran et al. 1996a; 1996b); discovering complex
word-internal structure between nonadjacent elements
(Newport & Aslin 2004; Onnis et al. 2005; Pen˜a et al.
2002); acquiring gender-like morphological systems
(Brooks et al. 1993; Frigo & McDonald 1998); locating
syntactic phrase boundaries (Saffran 2001; 2002); using
function words to delineate phrases (Green 1979); inte-
grating prosodic and morphological cues in the learning
of phrase structure (Morgan et al. 1987); integrating pho-
nological and distributional cues (Monaghan et al. 2005);
and detecting long-distance relationships between words
(Go´mez 2002; Onnis et al. 2003).
The close relationship between sequential learning and
grammatical ability has been further corroborated by
recent neuroimaging studies, showing that people trained
on an artificial language have the same event-related
potential (ERP) brainwave patterns to ungrammatical arti-
ficial-language sentences as to ungrammatical natural-
language sentences (Christiansen et al. 2007; Friederici
et al. 2002). Moreover, novel incongruent musical
sequences elicit ERP patterns that are statistically indistin-
guishable from syntactic incongruities in language (Patel
et al. 1998). Results from a magnetoencephalography
(MEG) experiment further suggest that Broca’s area
plays a crucial role in processing music sequences
(Maess et al. 2001). Finally, event-related functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown that the same
brain area – Broca’s area – is involved in an artificial
grammar learning task and in normal natural language
processing (Petersson et al. 2004). Further evidence
comes from behavioral studies with language-impaired
populations, showing that aphasia (Christiansen et al., sub-
mitted; Hoen et al. 2003), language learning disability
(Plante et al. 2002), and specific language impairment
(Hsu et al. 2006; Tomblin et al. 2007) are associated
with impaired sequential learning. Together, these
studies strongly suggest that there is considerable
overlap in the neural mechanisms involved in language
and sequential learning14 (see also Conway et al. 2007;
Ullman 2004; Wilkins & Wakefield 1995, for similar
perspectives).
This psychological research can be seen as a foundation
for work in functional and typological linguistics, indicat-
ing how theoretical constraints on sequential learning
and processing can explain certain universal patterns in
language structure and use. One suggestion, from O’Grady
(2005), is that the language processing system seeks to
resolve linguistic dependencies (e.g., between verbs and
their arguments) at the first opportunity – a tendency that
might not be syntax-specific, but, instead, an instance
of a general cognitive tendency to attempt to resolve ambi-
guities rapidly in linguistic (Clark 1975) and perceptual
input (Pomerantz & Kubovy 1986). In a similar vein,
Hawkins (1994; 2004) and Culicover (1999) propose
specific measures of processing complexity (roughly,
the number of linguistic constituents required to link
syntactic and conceptual structure), which they assume
underpin judgments concerning linguistic acceptability.
The collection of studies in Bybee (2007) further under-
scores the importance of frequency of use in shaping
language. Importantly, these lines of work have begun
to detail learning and processing constraints that can
help explain specific linguistic patterns, such as the afore-
mentioned examples of pronoun binding (previous
Examples 1–4; see O’Grady 2005) and heavy NP-shift
(Examples 5–6; see Hawkins 1994; 2004), and indicate
an increasing emphasis on performance constraints within
linguistics.
In turn, a growing body of empirical research in compu-
tational linguistics, cognitive science, and psycholinguistics
has begun to explore how these theoretical constraints
may be instantiated in terms of computational and psycho-
logical mechanisms. For instance, basic word order patterns
may thus derive frommemory constraints related to sequen-
tial learning and processing of linguistic material, as indi-
cated by computational simulations (e.g., Christiansen &
Devlin 1997; Kirby 1999; Lupyan & Christiansen 2002;
Van Everbroeck 1999), human experimentation involving
artificial languages (e.g., Christiansen 2000; Reeder 2004),
and cross-linguistic corpus analyses (e.g., Bybee 2002;
Hawkins 1994; 2004). Similarly, behavioral experiments
and computational modeling have provided evidence for
general processing constraints (instead of innate subjacency
constraints) on complex question formation (Berwick &
Weinberg 1984; Ellefson & Christiansen 2000).
6.4. Pragmatic constraints
Language is likely, moreover, to be substantially shaped by
the pragmatic constraints involved in linguistic communi-
cation. The program of developing and extending Gricean
implicatures (Grice 1967; Levinson 2000; Sperber &
Wilson 1986) has revealed enormous complexity in the
relationship between the literal meaning of an utterance
and the message that the speaker intends to convey. Prag-
matic processes may, indeed, be crucial in understanding
many aspects of linguistic structure, as well as the pro-
cesses of language change.
Consider the nature of anaphora and binding. Levinson
(2000) notes that the patterns of “discourse” anaphora,
Example (7), and syntactic anaphora, Example (8), have
interesting parallels.
7. a. John arrived. He began to sing.
b. John arrived. The man began to sing.
8. a. John arrived and he began to sing.
b. John arrived and the man began to sing.
In both (7) and (8), the first form indicates preferred
co-reference of he and John; the second form prefers
non-coreference. The general pattern is that brief
expressions encourage co-reference with a previously
introduced item; Grice’s maxim of quantity implies that,
by default, a prolix expression will not be used where a
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brief expression could be, and hence prolix expressions are
typically taken to imply non-coreference with previously
introduced entities. Where the referring expression is
absent, then co-reference may be required as in
Example (9), in which the singer can only be John:
9. John arrived and began to sing.
It is natural to assume that syntactic structures emerge,
diachronically, from reduction of discourse structures –
and that, in Givo´n’s phrase, “Yesterday’s discourse is
today’s syntax” (as cited in Tomasello 2008). The shift,
over time, from default constraint to rigid rule is wide-
spread in language change and much studied in the sub-
field of grammaticalization (see sect. 7.1).
Applying this pragmatic perspective to the binding con-
straints, Levinson (1987a; 1987b; 2000) notes that the
availability, but non-use, of the reflexive himself provides
a default (and later, perhaps, rigid) constraint that him
does not co-refer with John in Example (10).
10. a. Johni likes himselfi.
b. Johni likes himj.
Levinson (2000), building on related work by Reinhart
(1983), provides a comprehensive account of the binding
constraints, and putative exceptions to them, purely on
pragmatic principles (see also Huang 2000, for a cross-
linguistic perspective). In sum, pragmatic principles can
at least partly explain both the structure and origin of lin-
guistic patterns that are often viewed as solely formal
and, hence, arbitrary.
6.5. The impact of multiple constraints
In section 6 so far, we have discussed four types of con-
straints that have shaped the evolution of language. Impor-
tantly, we see these constraints as interacting with one
another, such that individual linguistic phenomena arise
from a combination of several different types of constraints.
For example, the patterns of binding phenomena are likely
to require explanations that cut across the four types of con-
straints, including constraints on cognitive processing
(O’Grady 2005) and pragmatics (Levinson 1987a; Reinhart
1983). That is, the explanation of any given aspect of
language is likely to require the inclusion of multiple over-
lapping constraints deriving from thought, perceptual-
motor factors, cognition, and pragmatics.
The idea of explaining language structure and use through
the integration of multiple constraints goes back at least to
early functionalist approaches to the psychology of language
(e.g., Bates &MacWhinney 1979; Bever 1970; Slobin 1973).
It plays an important role in current constraint-based
theories of sentence comprehension (e.g., MacDonald et al.
1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell 1995). Experiments have
demonstrated how adults’ interpretations of sentences are
sensitive to a variety of constraints, including specific
world knowledge relating to the content of an utterance
(e.g., Kamide et al. 2003), the visual context in which the
utterance is produced (e.g., Tanenhaus et al. 1995), the
sound properties of individual words (Farmer et al. 2006),
the processing difficulty of an utterance as well as how
such difficulty may be affected by prior experience (e.g.,
Reali & Christiansen 2007), and various pragmatic factors
(e.g., Fitneva & Spivey 2004). Similarly, the integration of
multiple constraints, or “cues,” also figures prominently in
contemporary theories of language acquisition (see e.g., con-
tributions in Golinkoff et al. 2000; Morgan &Demuth 1996;
Weissenborn & Ho¨hle 2001; for a review, see Monaghan &
Christiansen 2008).
Themultiple-constraints satisfactionperspective on language
evolution also offers an explanation of why language is
unique to humans: As a cultural product, language has been
shaped by constraints from multiple mechanisms, some of
which have properties unique to humans. Specifically, we
suggest that language does not involve any qualitatively differ-
ent mechanisms compared to extant apes, but instead a
number of quantitative evolutionary refinements of older
primate systems (e.g., for intention sharing and understand-
ing, Tomasello et al. 2005; or complex sequential learning
and processing,15 Conway & Christiansen 2001). These
changes could be viewed as providing necessary pre-
adaptations that, once in place, allowed language to emerge
through cultural transmission (e.g., Elman 1999). It is also
conceivable that initial changes, if functional, could have
been subject to further amplification through the Baldwin
effect, perhaps resulting in multiple quantitative shifts in
human evolution. The key point is that none of these
changes would result in the evolution of UG. The species-
specificity of a given trait does not necessitate postulating
specific biological adaptations for that trait. For example,
even though playing tag may be species-specific and
perhaps even universal, few people, if any, would argue
that humans have evolved specific adaptations for playing
this game. Thus, the uniqueness of language is better
viewed as part of the larger question:Why are humans differ-
ent from other primates? It seems clear that considering
language in isolation is not going to give us the answer to
this question.
7. How constraints shape language over time
According to the view that language evolution is deter-
mined by the development of UG, there is a sharp
divide between questions of language evolution (how the
genetic endowment could arise evolutionarily) and histori-
cal language change (which is viewed as variation within
the genetically determined limits of possible human
languages). By contrast, if language has evolved to fit
prior cognitive and communicative constraints, then it is
plausible that historical processes of language change
provide a model of language evolution; indeed, historical
language change may be language evolution in microcosm.
This perspective is consistent with much work in functional
and typological linguistics (e.g., Bever & Langendoen 1971;
Croft 2000; Givo´n 1998; Hawkins 2004; Heine & Kuteva
2002).
At the outset, it is natural to expect that language will be
the outcome of competing selectional forces. On the one
hand, as we shall note, there will be a variety of selectional
forces that make the language “easier” for speakers/
hearers; on the other, it is likely that expressibility is a
powerful selectional constraint, tending to increase lin-
guistic complexity over evolutionary time. For instance,
it has been suggested that the use of hierarchical structure
and limited recursion to express more complex meanings
may have arrived at later stages of language evolution
(Jackendoff 2002; Johansson 2006). Indeed, the modern
Amazonian language, Piraha˜, lacks recursion and has one
of the world’s smallest phoneme inventories (though its
morphology is complex), limiting its expressivity (Everett
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2005; but see also the critique by Nevins et al. 2007, and
Everett’s 2007 response).
While expressivity is one selectional force that may tend
to increase linguistic complexity, it will typically stand in
opposition to another: ease of learning and processing
will tend to favor linguistic simplicity. But the picture
may be more complex: in some cases, ease of learning
and ease of processing may stand in opposition. For
example, regularity makes items easier to learn; the short-
ening of frequent items, and consequent irregularity,
may make aspects of language easier to say. There are
similar tensions between ease of production (which
favors simplifying the speech signal) and ease of compre-
hension (which favors a richer, and hence more infor-
mative, signal). Moreover, whereas constraints deriving
from the brain provide pressures toward simplification of
language, processes of grammaticalization can add com-
plexity to language (e.g., by the emergence of morphologi-
cal markers). Thus, part of the complexity of language, just
as in biology, may arise from the complex interaction of
competing constraints.
7.1. Language evolution as linguistic change
Recent theory in diachronic linguistics has focused on
grammaticalization (e.g., Bybee et al. 1994; Heine 1991;
Hopper & Traugott 1993): the process by which functional
items, including closed class words and morphology,
develop from what are initially open-class items. This tran-
sitional process involves a “bleaching” of meaning, phono-
logical reduction, and increasingly rigid dependencies
with other items. Thus, the English number one is likely
to be the root to a(n). The Latin cantare habeo (I have
[something] to sing) mutated into chanterais, cantare´,
cantaro` (I will sing in French, Spanish, Italian). The
suffix corresponds phonologically to I have in each
language (respectively, ai, he, ho – the have element has
collapsed into inflectional morphology; Fleischman
1982). The same processes of grammaticalization can
also cause certain content words over time to get bleached
of their meaning and become grammatical particles. For
example, the use of go and have as auxiliary verbs (as in
I am going to sing or I have forgotten my hat) have been
bleached of their original meanings concerning physical
movement and possession (Bybee et al. 1994). The pro-
cesses of grammaticalization appear gradual and follow
historical patterns, suggesting that there are systematic
selectional pressures operative in language change. More
generally, these processes provide a possible origin of
grammatical structure from a proto-language initially
involving perhaps unordered and uninflected strings of
content words.
From a historical perspective, it is natural to view many
aspects of syntax as emerging from processing or prag-
matic factors. Revisiting our discussion of binding con-
straints, we might view complementary distributions of
reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns as initially arising
from pragmatic factors; the resulting pattern may be
acquired and modified by future generations of learners,
to some degree independently of those initial factors
(e.g., Givo´n 1979; Levinson 1987b). Thus, binding con-
straints might be a complex product of many forces,
including pragmatic factors, and learning and processing
biases – and hence, the subtlety of those constraints
should not be entirely surprising. But from the present
perspective, the fact that such a complex system of con-
straints is readily learnable, is neither puzzling, nor indica-
tive of an innately specified genetic endowment. Rather,
the constraints are learnable because they have been
shaped by the very pragmatic, processing and learning
constraints with which the learner is endowed.
Understanding the cognitive and communicative basis
for the direction of grammaticalization and related pro-
cesses is an important challenge. But equally, the sugges-
tion that this type of observable historical change may be
continuous with language evolution opens up the possi-
bility that research on the origin of language may not be
a theoretically isolated island of speculation, but may
connect directly with one of the most central topics in
linguistics: the nature of language change (e.g., Zeevat
2006). Indeed, grammaticalization has become the center of
many recent perspectives on the evolution of language
as mediated by cultural transmission across hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of generations of learners (e.g.,
Bybee et al. 1994; Givo´n 1998; Heine & Kuteva 2002;
Schoenemann 1999; Tomasello 2003). Although the
present approach also emphasizes the importance of
grammaticalization in the evolution of complex syntax, it
differs from other approaches in that we see this diachro-
nic process as being constrained by limitations on learning
and processing. Indeed, there have even been intriguing
attempts to explain some aspects of language change
with reference to the learning properties of connectionist
networks. For example, Hare and Elman (1995) demon-
strated how cross-generational learning by sequential
learning devices can model the gradual historical change
in English verb inflection from a complex past tense
system in Old English to the dominant “regular” class
and small classes of “irregular” verbs of modern English.
7.2. Language evolution through cultural transmission
How far can language evolution and historical processes of
language change be explained by general mechanisms of
cultural transmission? And how might language be selec-
tively distorted by such processes? Crucial to any such
model are assumptions about the channel over which cul-
tural information is transmitted, the structure of the
network of social interactions over which transmission
occurs, and the learning and processing mechanisms that
support the acquisition and use of the transmitted infor-
mation (Boyd & Richerson 2005).
A wide range of recent computational models of the
cultural transmission of language has been developed,
with different points of emphasis. Some of these models
have considered how language is shaped by the process of
transmission over successive generations, by the nature of
the communication problem to be solved, and/or by the
nature of the learners (e.g., Batali 1998; Kirby 1999). For
example, Kirby et al. (2007) show that, if information is
transmitted directly between individual learners, and lear-
ners sample grammars from the Bayes posterior distribution
of grammars, given that information, then language asymp-
totically converges to match the priors initially encoded by
the learners. In contrast, Smith et al. (2003a), using a differ-
ent model of how information is learned, indicate how com-
positional structure in language might have resulted from
the complex interaction of learning constraints and cultural
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transmission, resulting in a “learning bottleneck.” Moreover,
a growing number of studies have started to investigate the
potentially important interactions between biological and lin-
guistic adaptation in language evolution (e.g., Christiansen
et al. 2006; Hurford 1990; Hurford & Kirby 1999; Kvasnicka
& Pospichal 1999; Livingstone & Fyfe 2000; Munroe &
Cangelosi 2002; Smith 2002; 2004; Yamauchi 2001).
Of particular interest here are simulations indicating
that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure
may arise from constraints on learning and processing
(e.g., Kirby 1998; 1999; Van Everbroeck 1999). For
example, it has been suggested that subjacency constraints
may arise from cognitive limitations on sequential learning
(Ellefson & Christiansen 2000). Moreover, using rule-
based language induction, Kirby (1999) accounted for
the emergence of typological universals as a result of
domain-general learning and processing constraints.
Finally, note that, in line with the present arguments, a
range of recent studies have challenged the plausibility
of biological adaptation to arbitrary features of the linguis-
tic environment (e.g., Christiansen et al. 2006; Kirby &
Hurford 1997; Kirby et al. 2007; Munroe & Cangelosi
2002; Yamauchi 2001).
The range of factors known to be important in cultural
transmission (e.g., group size and networks of transmission
among group members, fidelity of transmission) has been
explored relatively little in simulation work. Furthermore,
to the extent that language is shaped by the brain, enriching
the models of cultural transmission of language against the
backdrop of learning and processing constraints, will be
an important direction for the study both of historical
language change and language evolution. More generally,
viewing language as shaped by cultural transmission
(Arbib 2005; Bybee 2002; Donald 1998) only provides
the starting point for an explanation of linguistic regu-
larities. The real challenge, we suggest, is to delineate the
wide range of constraints, from perceptuo-motor to prag-
matic (as sketched earlier in sect. 6), that operate on
language evolution. Detailing these constraints is likely to
be crucial for explanations of complex linguistic regu-
larities, and how they can readily be learned and processed.
We note here that this perspective on the adaptation of
language differs importantly from the processes of cultural
change that operate through deliberate and conscious
innovation and/or evaluation of cultural variants. On our
account, the processes of language change operate to
make languages easier to learn and process, and more
communicatively effective. But these changes do not
operate through processes either of “design” or deliberate
adoption by language users. Thus, following Darwin, we
view the origin of the adaptive complexity in language as
analogous to the origin of adaptive complexity in biology.
Specifically, the adaptive complexity of biological organ-
isms is presumed to arise from random genetic variation,
winnowed by natural selection (a “blind watchmaker”;
Dawkins 1986). We argue that the adaptive complexity
of language arises, similarly, from random linguistic vari-
ation winnowed by selectional pressures, though here con-
cerning learning and processing (so again, we have a blind
watchmaker).
By contrast, for aspects of cultural changes for which
variants are either created, or selected, by deliberate
choice, the picture is very different. Such cultural products
can be viewed instead as arising from the incremental
action of processes of intelligent design, and more or less
explicit evaluations, and decisions to adopt (see Chater
2005). Many phenomena discussed by evolutionary theor-
ists concerning culture (e.g., Campbell 1965; Richerson
& Boyd 2005) – including those described by meme-
theorists (e.g., Blackmore 1999; Dawkins 1976; Dennett
1995) – fall into this latter category. Explanations of
fashions (e.g., wearing baseball caps backwards), catch-
phrases, memorable tunes, engineering methods, cultural
conventions and institutions (e.g., marriage, revenge kill-
ings), scientific and artistic ideas, religious views, and so
on, seem patently to be products of sighted watchmakers;
that is, they are products, in part at least, of many gener-
ations of intelligent designers, imitators, and critics.
Our focus here concerns, instead, the specific and inter-
dependent constraints which operate on particular linguis-
tic structures and of which people have no conscious
awareness. Presumably, speakers do not deliberately
contemplate syntactic reanalyses of existing structures,
bleach the meaning of common verbs so that they play
an increasingly syntactic role, or collapse discourse struc-
ture into syntax or syntactic structure into morphology.
Of course, there is some deliberate innovation in language
(e.g., people consciously invent new words and phrases).
But such deliberate innovations should be sharply
distinguished from the unconscious operation of the
basic learning and processing biases that have shaped
the phonological, syntactic, and semantic regularities of
language.
7.3. Language change “in vivo”
We have argued that language has evolved over time to be
compatible with the human brain. However, it might be
objected that it is not clear that languages become better
adapted over time, given that they all seem capable of
expressing a similar range of meanings (Sereno 1991). In
fact, the idea that all languages are fundamentally equal
and independent of their users – uniformitarianism – is
widely adopted in linguistics, preventing many linguists
from thinking about language evolution (Newmeyer
2003). Yet, much variation exists in how easy it is to use a
given language to express a particular meaning, given the
limitations of human learning and processing mechanisms.
The recent work on creolization in sign language pro-
vides a window onto how pressures towards increased
expressivity interact with constraints on learning and
processing “in vivo.” In less than three decades, a sign
language has emerged in Nicaragua, created by deaf
children with little exposure to established languages.
Senghas et al. (2004) compared signed expressions for
complex motions produced by deaf signers of Nicaraguan
Sign Language (NSL) with the gestures of hearing
Spanish speakers. The results showed that the hearing
individuals used a single simultaneous movement com-
bining both manner and path of motion, whereas the
deaf NSL signers tended to break the event into two con-
secutive signs: one for the path of motion and another for
the manner. Moreover, this tendency was strongest for
the signers who had learned NSL more recently, indicat-
ing that NSL has changed from using a holistic way of
denoting motion events to a more sequential, compo-
sitional format.
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Although such creolization may be considered as evi-
dence of UG (e.g., Bickerton 1984; Pinker 1994), the
results may be better construed in terms of cognitive con-
straints on cultural transmission. Indeed, computational
simulations have demonstrated how iterated learning in
cultural transmission can change a language starting as a
collection of holistic form-meaning pairings into a more
compositional format, in which sequences of forms are
combined to produce meanings previously expressed holi-
stically (see Kirby &Hurford 2002, for a review). Similarly,
human experimentation operationalizing iterated learning
within a new “cross-generational” paradigm – in which
the output of one artificial-language learner is used as the
input for subsequent “generations” of language learners –
has shown that such learning biases over generations can
change the structure of artificial languages from holistic
mappings to a compositional format (Cornish 2006). This
allows language to have increased expressivity, while
being learnable from exposure to a finite set of form-
meaning pairings. Thus, the change towards using sequen-
tial compositional forms to describe motion events in NSL
can be viewed as a reflection of similar processes of learning
and cultural transmission.
In a similar vein, the rapid emergence of a regular SOV
(subject-object-verb) word order in Al-Sayyid Bedouin
Sign Language (ABSL) (Sandler et al. 2005) can be inter-
preted as arising from constraints on learning and proces-
sing. ABSL has a longer history than NSL, going back
some 70 years. The Al-Sayyid Bedouin group, located in
the Negev desert region of southern Israel, forms an iso-
lated community with a high incidence of congenital deaf-
ness. In contrast to NSL, which developed within a school
environment, ABSL has evolved in a more natural setting
and is recognized as the second language of the Al-Sayyid
village. A key feature of ABSL is that is has developed a
basic SOV word order within sentences (e.g., boy apple
eat), with modifiers following heads (e.g., apple red).
Although this type of word order is very common across
the world (Dryer 1992), it is found neither in the local
spoken Arabic dialect nor in Israeli Sign Language
(ISL), suggesting that ABSL has developed these gramma-
tical regularities de novo.
In a series of computational simulations, Christiansen
and Devlin (1997) found that languages with consistent
word order were easier to learn by a sequential learning
device compared to inconsistent word orders. Thus, a
language with a grammatical structure such as ABSL was
easier to learn than one in which an SOV word order
was combined with a modifier-head order within phrases.
Similar results were obtained when human subjects were
trained on artificial languages with either consistent or
inconsistent word orders (Christiansen 2000; Reeder
2004). Further simulations have demonstratedhow sequen-
tial learning biases can lead to the emergence of languages
with regular word orders through cultural transmission –
even when starting from a language with a completely
random word order (Christiansen & Dale 2004; Reali &
Christiansen, in press).
Differences in learnability are not confined to newly
emerged languages but can also be observed in well-
established languages. For example, Slobin and Bever
(1982) found that when children learning English,
Italian, Turkish, or Serbo-Croatian were asked to act out
reversible transitive sentences, such as the horse kicked
the cow, using familiar toy animals, language-specific
differences in performance emerged. Turkish-speaking
children performed very well already at 2 years of age,
most likely because of the regular case-markings in this
language, indicating who is doing what to whom. Young
English- and Italian-speaking children initially performed
slightly worse than the Turkish children but quickly caught
up around 3 years of age, relying on the relatively consist-
ent word order information available in these languages,
with subjects preceding objects. The children acquiring
Serbo-Croatian, on the other hand, had problems deter-
mining the meaning of the simple sentences, most likely
because this language uses a combination of case-markings
and word order to indicate agent and patient roles in a sen-
tence. Crucially, only masculine and feminine nouns take
on accusative or nominative markings and can occur in any
order with respect to one another, but sentences with one
or more unmarked neuter nouns are typically ordered as
subject-verb-object. Of course, Serbo-Croatian children
eventually catch up with the Turkish-, English-, and
Italian-speaking children, but these results do show that
some meanings are harder to learn and process in some
languages compared to others, indicating differential
fitness across languages (see Lupyan & Christiansen
2002, for corroborating computational simulations).
Within specific languages, substantial differences also
exist between individual idiolects; for example, as demon-
strated by the considerable differences in language compre-
hension abilities among cleaners, janitors, undergraduates,
graduate students, and lecturers from the same British
university (Dabrowska 1997). Even within the reasonably
homogeneous group of college students, individual differ-
ences exist in sentence processing abilities because of
underlying variations in learning and processing mechan-
isms combined with variations in exposure to language
(for a review, see MacDonald & Christiansen 2002).
Additional sources of variation are likely to come from the
incorporation of linguistic innovations into the language.
In this context, it has been suggested that innovations
may primarily be due to adults (Bybee, in press), whereas
constraints on children’s acquisition of language may
provide the strongest pressure towards regularization
(e.g., Hudson Kam & Newport 2005). Thus, once we
abandon linguistic uniformitarianism, it becomes clear
that there is much variability for linguistic adaptation to
work with.
In sum, we have argued that human language has been
shaped by selectional pressure from thousands of gener-
ations of language learners and users. Linguistic variants
that are easier to learn to understand and produce; var-
iants that are more economical, expressive, and generally
effective in communication, persuasion, and perhaps
indicative of status and social group, will be favored. Just
as with the multiple selectional pressures operative in bio-
logical evolution, the matrix of factors at work in driving
the evolution of language is complex. Nonetheless, as we
have seen, candidate pressures can be proposed (e.g.,
the pressure for incrementality, minimizing memory
load, regularity, brevity, and so on); and regular patterns
of language change that may be responses to those press-
ures can be identified (e.g., the processes of successive
entrenchment, generalization, and erosion of structure
evident in grammaticalization). Thus, the logical problem
of language evolution that appears to confront attempts
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to explain how a genetically specified linguistic endow-
ment could become encoded, does not arise; it is not the
brain that has somehow evolved to language, but the
reverse.
8. Scope of the argument
In this target article, we have presented a theory of language
evolution as shaped by the brain. From this perspective, the
close fit between language learners and the structure of
natural language that motivates many theorists to posit a
language-specific biological endowment may instead arise
from processes of adaptation operating on language itself.
Moreover, we have argued that there are fundamental dif-
ficulties with postulating a language-specific biological
endowment. It is implausible that such an endowment
could evolve through adaptation (because the prior linguis-
tic environments would be too diverse to give rise to univer-
sal principles). It is also unlikely that a language-specific
endowment of any substantial complexity arose through
non-adaptational genetic mechanisms, because the prob-
ability of a functional language system arising essentially
by chance is vanishingly small. Instead, we have suggested
that some apparently arbitrary aspects of language structure
may arise from the interaction of a range of factors, from
general constraints on learning, to impacts of semantic
and pragmatic factors, and concomitant processes of gram-
maticalization and other aspects of language change. But,
intriguingly, it also possible that many apparently arbitrary
aspects of language can be explained by relatively natural
cognitive constraints – and hence, that language may be
rather less arbitrary than at first supposed (e.g., Bates &
MacWhinney 1979; 1987; Bybee 2007; Elman 1999; Kirby
1999; Levinson 2000; O’Grady 2005; Tomasello 2003).
8.1. The logical problem of language evolution meets
the logical problem of language acquisition
The present viewpoint has interesting theoretical impli-
cations concerning language acquisition. Children acquire
the full complexity of natural language over a relatively
short amount of time, from exposure to noisy and partial
samples of language. The ability to develop complex linguis-
tic abilities from what appears to be such poor input has
led many to speak of the “logical” problem of language
acquisition (e.g., Baker & McCarthy 1981; Hornstein &
Lightfoot 1981). One solution to the problem is to
assume that learners have some sort of biological “head
start” in language acquisition – that their learning appar-
atus is precisely meshed with the structure of natural
language. This viewpoint is, of course, consistent with
theories according to which there is a genetically specified
language organ, module, or instinct (e.g., Chomsky 1986;
1993; Crain 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini 1989; 1994; Pinker
1994; Pinker & Bloom 1990). But it is also consistent with
the present view that languages have evolved to be learn-
able. According to this view, the mesh between language
learning and language structure has occurred not because
specialized biological machinery embodies the principles
that govern natural languages (UG), but rather that the
structure of language has evolved to fit with pre-linguistic
learning and processing constraints.
If language has evolved to be learnable, then the
problem of language acquisition may have been misana-
lyzed. Language acquisition is frequently viewed as a
standard problem of induction (e.g., Gold 1967; Jain
et al. 1999; Osherson et al. 1986; Pinker 1984; 1989),
where there is a vast space of possible grammars that
are consistent with the linguistic data to which the child
is exposed. Accordingly, it is often readily concluded
that the child must have innate knowledge of language
structure to constrain the space of possible grammars to
a manageable size. But, if language is viewed as having
been shaped by the brain, then language learning is by
no means a standard problem of induction. To give an
analogy, according to the standard view of induction,
the problem of language acquisition is like being in an
unreasonable quiz show, where you have inadequate
information but must somehow guess the “correct”
answer. But according to the present view, by contrast,
there is no externally given correct answer; instead, the
task is simply to give the same answer as everybody else –
because the structure of language will have adapted to
conform to this most “popular” guess. This is a much
easier problem: Whatever learning biases people have, so
long as these biases are shared across individuals, learning
should proceed successfully. Moreover, the viewpoint that
children learn language using general-purpose cognitive
mechanisms, rather than language-specific mechanisms,
has also been advocated independently from a variety
of different perspectives ranging from usage-based and
functional accounts of language acquisition (e.g., Bates &
MacWhinney 1979; 1987; MacWhinney 1999; Seidenberg
1997; Seidenberg & MacDonald 2001; Tomasello 2000a;
2000b; 2000c; 2003) to cultural transmission views of
language evolution (e.g., Davidson 2003; Donald 1998;
Ragir 2002; Schoenemann 1999), to neurobiological
approaches to language (e.g., Arbib 2005; Deacon 1997;
Elman et al. 1996) and formal language theory (Chater &
Vita´nyi 2007).
From this perspective, the problem of language acqui-
sition is very different from learning, say, some aspect of
the physical world. In learning naı¨ve physics, the con-
straints to be learned (e.g., how rigid bodies move, how
fluids flow, and so on) are defined by processes outside
the cognitive system. External processes define the
“right” answers, to which learners must converge. But
in language acquisition, the structure of the language to
be learned is itself determined by the learning of gener-
ations of previous learners (see Zuidema 2003). Because
learners have similar learning biases, this means that the
first wild guesses that the learner makes about how some
linguistic structure works are likely to be the right
guesses. More generally, in language acquisition, the
learner’s biases, if shared by other learners, are likely to
be helpful in acquiring the language – because the
language has been shaped by processes of selection to
conform with those biases. This also means that the
problem of the poverty of the stimulus (e.g., Chomsky
1980; Crain 1991; Crain & Pietroski 2001) is reduced,
because language has been shaped to be learnable from
the kind of noisy and partial input available to young
children. Thus, language acquisition is constrained by
substantial biological constraints – but these constraints
emerge from cognitive machinery that is not language-
specific.
Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5 507
8.2. Natural selection for functional aspects
of language?
It is important to emphasize what our arguments are not
intended to show. In particular, we are not suggesting that
biological adaptation is irrelevant for language. Indeed, it
seems likely that a number of pre-adaptations for language
might have occurred (see Hurford 2003, for a review),
such as the ability to represent discrete symbols (Deacon
1997; Tomasello 2003), to reason about other minds (Malle
2002), to understand and share intentions (Tomasello
2003; Tomasello et al. 2005), and to perform pragmatic
reasoning (Levinson 2000). There may also be a connection
with the emergence of an exceptionally prolonged childhood
(Locke & Bogin 2006). Similarly, biological adaptations
might have led to improvements to the cognitive systems
that support language, including increased working
memory capacity (Gruber 2002), domain-general capacities
for word learning (Bloom 2001), and complex hierarchical
sequential learning abilities (Calvin 1994; Conway &
Christiansen 2001; Greenfield 1991; Hauser et al. 2002),
though these adaptations are likely to have been for
improved cognitive skills rather than for language.
Some language-specific adaptations may nonetheless
have occurred as well, but given our arguments above
these would only be for functional features of language,
and not the arbitrary features of UG. For example,
changes to the human vocal tract may have resulted in
more intelligible speech (Lieberman 1984; 1991; 2003 –
though see also Hauser & Fitch 2003); selectional pressure
for this functional adaptation might apply relatively inde-
pendently of the particular language. Similarly, it remains
possible that the Baldwin effect may be invoked to explain
cognitive adaptations to language, provided that these adap-
tations are to functional aspects of language, rather than
putatively arbitrary linguistic structures. For example, it
has been suggested that theremight be a specialized percep-
tion apparatus for speech (e.g., Vouloumanos & Werker
2007), or enhancement of the motor control system for
articulation (e.g., Studdert-Kennedy & Goldstein 2003).
But explaining innate adaptations even in these domains is
likely to be difficult – because, if adaptation to language
occurs at all, it is likely to occur not merely to functionally
universal features (e.g., the fact that languages segment
into words), but to specific cues for those features (e.g.,
for segmenting those words in the current linguistic envi-
ronment, which differ dramatically across languages;
Cutler et al. 1986; Otake et al. 1993). Hence, adaptationist
explanations, even for functional aspects of language and
language processing, should be treated with considerable
caution.
8.3. Implications for the co-evolution of
genes and culture
Our argument may, however, have applications beyond
language. Many theorists have suggested that, just as
there are specific genetic adaptations to language, there
may also be specific genetic adaptations to other cultural
domains. The arguments we have outlined against biologi-
cal adaptationism in language evolution appear to apply
equally to rule out putative co-evolution of the brain
with any rapidly changing and highly varied aspect of
human culture – from marriage practices and food
sharing practices, to music and art, to folk theories of reli-
gion, science, or mathematics. We speculate that, in each
case, the apparent fit between culture and the brain arises
primarily because culture has been shaped to fit with our
prior cognitive biases. Thus, by analogy with language, we
suggest that nativist arguments across these domains
might usefully be re-evaluated, from the perspective that
culture may have adapted to cognition much more sub-
stantially than cognition has adapted to culture.
In summary, we have argued that the notion of UG
is subject to a logical problem of language evolution,
whether it is suggested to be the result of gradual biologi-
cal adaptation or other non-adaptationist factors. Instead,
we have proposed to explain the close fit between language
and learners as arising from the fact that language is
shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse.
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NOTES
1. For the purposes of exposition, we use the term “language
genes” as shorthand for genes that may be involved in encoding a
potential UG. By using this term, we do not mean to suggest that
this relationship necessarily involves a one-to-one correspon-
dence between individual genes and a specific aspect of language
(or cognition).
2. Intermediate positions, which accord some role to both
non-adaptationist and adaptationist mechanisms, are, of course,
possible. Such intermediate viewpoints inherit the logical pro-
blems that we discuss in the following sections for both types
of approach, in proportion to the relative contribution presumed
to be associated with each. Moreover, we note that our argu-
ments have equal force independent of whether one assumes
that language has a vocal (e.g., Dunbar 2003) or manual-
gesture (e.g., Corballis 2003) based origin.
3. Strictly, the appropriate measure is the more subtle inclus-
ive fitness, which takes into account the reproductive potential
not just of an organism, but also a weighted sum of the reproduc-
tive potentials of its kin, where the weighting is determined by
the closeness of kinship (Hamilton 1964). Moreover, mere repro-
duction is only of value to the degree that one’s offspring have a
propensity to reproduce, and so down the generations.
4. In addition, Pinker and Bloom (1990) point out that it is
often the case that natural selection has several (equally adaptive)
alternatives to choose from to carry out a given function (e.g.,
both the invertebrate and the vertebrate eye support vision
despite having significant architectural differences).
5. One prominent view is that language emerged within the
last 100,000 to 200,000 years (e.g., Bickerton 2003). Hominid
populations over this period, and before, appear to have under-
gone waves of spread; “modern languages derive mostly or
completely from a single language spoken in East Africa
around 100 kya . . . it was the only language then existing that
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survived and evolved with rapid differentiation and transform-
ation” (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 2003, p. 273).
6. Human genome-wide scans have revealed evidence of
recent positive selection for more than 250 genes (Voight et al.
2006), making it very likely that genetic adaptations for language
would have continued in this scenario.
7. This setup closely resembles the one used by Hinton and
Nowlan (1987) in their simulations of the Baldwin effect, and to
whichPinker andBloom (1990) refer in support of their adaptation-
ist account of language evolution. The simulations are also similar in
format to other models of language evolution (e.g., Briscoe 2003;
Kirby & Hurford 1997; Nowak et al. 2001). Note, however, the
reported simulations have a very different purpose from that of
work on understanding historical language change from a UG per-
spective, for example, as involving successive changes in linguistic
parameters (e.g., Baker 2001; Lightfoot 2000; Yang 2002).
8. Some recent theorists have proposed that a further pressure
for language divergence between groups is the sociolinguistic ten-
dency for groups to “badge” their in-group by difficult-to-fake
linguistic idiosyncrasies (Baker 2003; Nettle & Dunbar 1997).
Such pressures would increase the pace of language divergence,
and thus exacerbate the problem of divergence for adaptationist
theories of language evolution.
9. This type of phenomenon, where the genetically influenced
behavior of an organism affects the environment to which those
genes are adapting, is known as Baldwinian niche construction
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Weber & Depew 2003).
10. Indeed, a population genetic study by Dediu and Ladd
(2007) could, on the one hand, be taken as pointing to biological
adaptations for a surface feature of phonology: the adoption of a
single-tier phonological system relying only on phoneme-
sequence information to differentiate between words, instead
of a two-tier system incorporating both phonemes and tones
(i.e., pitch contours). Specifically, two particular alleles of
ASPM and Microcephalin, both related to brain development,
were strongly associated with languages that incorporate a
single-tier phonological system, even when controlling for geo-
graphical factors and common linguistic history. On the other
hand, given that the relevant mutations would have had to
occur independently several times, the causal explanation plausi-
bly goes in the opposite direction, from genes to language. The
two alleles may have been selected for other reasons relating to
brain development; but once in place, they made it harder to
acquire phonological systems involving tonal contrasts, which,
in turn, allowed languages without tonal contrasts to evolve
more readily. This perspective (also advocated by Dediu &
Ladd 2007) dovetails with our suggestion that language is
shaped by the brain, as discussed in sects. 5 to 7). However,
either of these interpretations would argue against an adaptation-
ist account of UG.
11. We have presented the argument in informal terms.
A more rigorous argument is as follows. We can measure the
amount of information embodied in Universal Grammar, U,
over and above the information in pre-existing cognitive pro-
cesses, C, by the length of the shortest code that will generate
U from C. This is the conditional Kolmogorov complexity
K(UjC) (Li & Vita´nyi 1997). By the coding theorem of Kolmo-
gorov complexity theory (Li & Vita´nyi 1997), the probability of
randomly generating U from C is approximately 22K(UjC). Thus,
if Universal Grammar has any substantial complexity, then it
has a vanishingly small probability of being encountered by a
random process, such as a non-adaptational mechanism.
12. Darwin may have had several reasons for pointing to these
similarities. Given that comparative linguistics at the time was
considered to be a model science on a par with geology and com-
parative anatomy, he may have used comparisons between lin-
guistic change – which was thought to be well understood at
that time – and species change to corroborate his theory of evol-
ution (Alter 1998; Beer 1996). Darwin may also have used these
language-species comparisons to support the notion that less
“civilized” human societies spoke less civilized languages,
because he believed that this was predicted by his theory of
human evolution (Raddick 2000; 2002).
13. Chomsky has sometimes speculated that the primary role
of language may be as a vehicle for thought, rather than com-
munication (e.g., Chomsky 1980). This viewpoint has its
puzzles: for example, the existence of anything other than seman-
tic representations is difficult to understand, as it is these over
which thought is defined; and the semantic representations in
Chomsky’s recent theorizing are, indeed, too underspecified to
support inference, throwing the utility of even these represen-
tations into doubt.
14. Some studies purportedly indicate that the mechanisms
involved in syntactic language are not the same as those involved
in most sequential learning tasks (e.g., Friederici et al. 2006; Pen˜a
et al. 2002). However, the methods used in these studies have sub-
sequently been shown to be fundamentally flawed (deVries et al. [in
press] and Onnis et al. [2005], respectively), thereby undermining
their negative conclusions. Thus, the preponderance of the evi-
dence suggests that sequential learning tasks tap into the mechan-
isms involved in language acquisition and processing.
15. The current knowledge regarding the FOXP2 gene is con-
sistent with the suggestion of a human pre-adaptation for sequen-
tial learning (Fisher 2006). FOXP2 is highly conserved across
species; but two amino acid changes have occurred after the
split between humans and chimps, and these became fixed in
the human population about 200,000 years ago (Enard et al.
2002). In humans, mutations to FOXP2 result in severe speech
and orofacial motor impairments (Lai et al. 2001; MacDermot
et al. 2005). Studies of FOXP2 expression in mice and imaging
studies of an extended family pedigree with FOXP2 mutations
have provided evidence that this gene is important to neural
development and function, including of the corticostriatal
system (Lai et al. 2003). This system has been shown to be
important for sequential (and other types of procedural) learning
(Packard & Knowlton 2002). Crucially, preliminary findings from
a mother and daughter with a translocation involving FOXP2
indicate that they have problems with both language and sequen-
tial learning (Tomblin et al. 2004).
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Abstract: Sign languages provide direct evidence for the relation between
human languages and the body that engenders them. We discuss the use of
the hands to create symbols and the role of the body in sign language verb
systems, especially in two quite recently developed sign languages, Israeli
Sign Language and Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language.
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